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A B S T R A C T
The following report is a study of various aspects of the
relationship between heavy water and the development of the
civilian and military uses of atomic energy. It begins with
a historical sketch which traces the heavy water storyfrom
its discovery by Harold Urey in 1932 through its coming of
age from scientific curiosity to strategic nuclear material
at the eve of World War II and finally into the post-war
period, where the military and civilian strands have some-
times seemed inextricably entangled. The report next assesses
the nonproliferation implications of the use of heavy water-
moderated power reactors; several different reactor types
are discussed, but the focus in on the natural uranium, on-
power fueled, pressure tube reactor developed in Canada, the
CANDU. The need for and development of on-power fueling safe-
guards is discussed in some detail. Also considered is the
use of heavy water in plutonium production reactors as well
as the broader issue of the relative nuclear leverage that
suppliers can bring to bear on countries with natural ura-
nium-fueled reactors as compared to those using enriched
designs. The final chapter reviews heavy water production
methods and analyzes the difficulties involved in implemen-
ting these on both a large and a small scale. It concludes
- i -
with an overview of proprietary and nonproliferation constraints
on heavy water technology transfer.
Our major conclusions are as follows:
1. On-power fueling of CANDU reactors leads to special,
well recognized safeguarding problems. These have been addres-
sed by a safeguards development program, encompassing both
systems analysis and hardware development, jointly sponsored
by Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. (AECL), the Canadian Atomic
Energy Control Board (AECB), and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). The approach involves surveillance,
containment, and item-counting of irradiated fuel bundles.
Although the complete system has not as yet been tested on
an operating reactor, it appears to be a good example of
"proliferation resistance engineering." The major problem
may be the political one of obtaining agreement to incorporate
the system in operating reactors and those under construction.
2. The question of relative leverage on natural uranium
vs. enriched uranium fuel cycles does not have a neat answer.
At the moment, most of the countries of proliferation concern
have neither large amounts of uranium ore nor the ability to
enrich it. (There are, of course, some significant excep-
tions, the most obvious being South Africa which has both.)
In the near term, the chances of achieving a consensus among
current suppliers of separative work, all of whom belong to
the London Club, not to supply it in the event of violations
of nonproliferation agreements, also seems greater than the
- ii -
prospects of reaching a similar agreement among all countries
who might be able to supply uranium ore. If we assume in ad-
dition that the malefactor also can produce heavy water--no
small matter--the potential leverage advantage would seem to
lie with enriched reactors. On the other hand, the spread of
enrichment technology--which is easier to rationalize on civil-
ian grounds if enriched reactors are in place--could tip the
scales the other way. In general, however, this weighing of
enriched vs. natural uranium fuel cycles is unnecessarily
restrictive. Experience has shown that there are many poten-
tial levers--nuclear and non-nuclear--which can be used to
persuade countries to adhere to nonproliferation norms. The
heart of the matter is the political will to use these in the
face of conflicting policy objectives.
3. Unlike uranium enrichment via gaseous diffusion and
the gas centrifuge, key aspects of which are closely held on
nonproliferation grounds, techniques for heavy water produc-
tion, particularly by hydrogen sulfide-water exchange (the GS
process), have been extensively documented in the open liter-
ature. Nevertheless, construction and operation of large
plants are difficult, and thus there is good reason to believe
that the technology will not spread rapidly through the indig-
enous efforts of developing countries. Unlike uranium enrich-
ment and fuel reprocessing, heavy water production does not
provide a direct route from civilian fuel cycle to weapons-
usable materials; on these grounds a logical quid pro quo for
- iii -
its transfer would be adherence to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) or acceptance of the principle of full-scope
safeguards by the recipient.
- iv -
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"I told the President in general terms of the great
progress we had made, and that our scientists were now defi-
nitely convinced that results might be reached before the
end of the present war. He said his people were getting along
too, but no one could tell whether anything practical would
emerge until a full-scale experiment had been made. We both
felt painfully the dangers of doing nothing. We knew what
efforts the Germans were making to procure supplies of 'heavy
water'--a sinister term, eerie, unnatural, which began to
creep into our secret papers. What if the enemy should get
an atomic bomb before we did! However sceptical one might
feel about the assertions of scientists, much disputed among
themselves and expressed in jargon incomprehensible to laymen,
we could not run the mortal risk of being outstripped in this
awful sphere."
Winston Churchill, recounting his
conversation with Franklin Roosevelt
at Hyde Park on June 20, 1942. In:
The Hinge of Fate (Houghton Mifflin
Co., Boston, 1950) p. 380.
1. THE HEAVY WATER CONNECTION
1.1 Discovery of Deuterium and Early History
In 1932, two fundamental discoveries in the field of
nuclear physics were reported, that of the neutron by Chadwick
in England and a stable isotope of hydrogen of atomic weight
two by Urey, Brickwedde and Murphy in the United States.2
Their existence had been speculated about for many years, and
the experimental confirmation initiated an intense period of
scientific activity which in turn led to many important results
of both a basic and applied nature. In this paper we concen-
trate on deuterium (D)--the name given to the hydrogen isotope
by Urey and his co-workers--and, in particular, on the heavy
isotope of water, heavy water (D20). However, the neutron
is an essential element in the story since it is the inter-
action between the neutrons produced by the fission of uranium
and heavy water which forms the basis for our interest in the
latter.
In 1911 Sir J.J. Thomson, the discoverer of the electron,
reported on a series of experiments in which he observed two
varieties of positive ions of molecular weight three3 using
an electromagnetic separation technique. In retrospect, it
seems clear that these were ions of the monodeuterated hydro-
4gen (HD) and tritium molecules (T), although an unequivocal
claim was not made at the time. Besides Thomson's pioneering
studies only two investigations relating to the possible existence
of deuterium were reported up to 1927, when the matter seemed
to be conclusively settled--in the negative--by Aston's mass
-2-
spectrographic determination of the atomic weight of hy-
drogen in agreement with.the atomic weight determined
5by chemical means. However, the discovery of an oxygen iso-
tope of atomic weight roughly equal to 18 by Giauque and John-
son in 19296 reopened the question, since Aston's atomic weights
were based on the mass 16 isotope of oxygen taken as exactly 16,
while the chemical atomic weights are based on the natural iso-
topic mixture taken as exactly 16. The determination in 1931
of the relative abundance of the o16 and 018 isotopes7--017
had not as yet been detected--led Birge and Menzel to suggest8
that the resulting discrepancy in the chemical and mass spectro-
graphic atomic weights could be removed by postulating the
existence of an isotope of hydrogen of mass 2, with a relative
abundance H/D = 4500. They also remarked that it should be
possible, although difficult, to detect such an isotope by
means of band spectra.
The experimental challenge was soon taken up by Urey and
his co-workers at Columbia, who predicted that considerable
differences in the relative vapor pressures of H2, HD and HT
in the solid state should exist, and hence that the fractional
distillation of liquid hydrogen near its triple point should
be an effective method for the concentration of any heavier
isotopes. The experimental procedure was to photograph lines
in the atomic spectrum of ordinary hydrogen and the residue
from the evaporation of 4 liters of liquid hydrogen. In both
cases spectral lines characteristic of deuterium were detected,
although they were much more intense for the hydrogen enriched
-3-
by distillation. The natural abundance of deuterium was found
to be one part in 4000. No evidence for tritium was found.
The discovery of deuterium was rapidly confirmed by other
investigators, and over the next three years, some 200 papers
dealing with its production, properties and use in research
in physics, chemistry, and biology were published. Since
the immediate problem was to get enough heavy water to conduct
experiments, considerable effort was devoted to devising
efficient separation techniques. Of these, electrolysis of
water--utilizing the fact that the hydrogen developed at the
cathode of an electrolytic cell contains less deuterium than
the water from whence it came--was found to be the most con-
venient and rapid method for the production of relatively
large quantities of heavy water. The concentration of deuterium
could be increased to any desired level by either continually
electrolyzing the water in a single cell down to an ever smaller
volume, or by progressive enrichment in a cascade, each of
- ~ ~ whose stages consists of a group of cells connected in parallel,
whose number decreases as the deuterium concentration increases
(see Fig. 1). The former technique was first suggested by
Washburn and Urey9 who produced water containing a few percent
of deuterium; subsequently, Lewis and McDonald 0 obtained 0.1
gram of practically pure D20 as the residue of electrolysis of
20 liters of water. (Since it takes about 6.6 KWh to electrolyze
one liter of water, the unit energy consumption of this product
was approximately 132 KWh/gram.) The cascade technique was
-4-
used in various laboratory-scale production plants; e.g., at
Columbia University, natural water pre-enriched to 0.5% in
the large electrolytic cells of the Ohio Chemical Co. could
be brought to a concentration of 99.9% in four stages."1 Al-
though approximately 20 universities in the US and Europe
were producing small quantities of heavy water by 1934, it
was an expensive and somewhat hazardous undertaking--due to
the potential for explosive recombination of the hydrogen and
oxygen--and to meet the increasing demand, several companies
undertook commercial production. Besides Ohio Chemical, there
was Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., in England, and Norsk
Hydro in Norwayl2 Due to the high capital costs and heavy ener-
gy consumption associated with electrolysis, large scale pro-
duction of heavy water is economic only if the raison d'etre
of the electrolysis plant is not heavy water, but hydrogen for
use as a feed material in ammonia synthesis. That is, electro-
lytic heavy water separation is a '!parasitic" process, with
the amount of D20 produced limited by the magnitude of the
associated hydrogen production. In this sense, the Norsk Hydro
electrolysis plant at Vermok was--literally--ideally situated,
on the side of a rockface below the huge Rjukan Foss waterfall
which provided--via an adjacent generating station--approxi-
mately 100 megawatts of cheap hydroelectric power for the pro-
duction of about 20,000 m3 of hydrogen per hour 1 3 To effect
heavy water production the electrolytic cells were arranged
in a nine-stage steady-flow cascade. About 73% of the water
-5-
fed to each stage was electrolyzed; the remaining 27%, which
accompanied the hydrogen and oxygen produced in that stage as
steam, was condensed and fed to the next higher stage. (In
cascade terminology, the cut, , defined as the ratio of product
to feed per stage, was 0.27.) The output of the primary plant
was water containing 15% D. To produce material of higher con-
centrations, this product was fed to a specially designed
secondary plant, which also consisted of nine stages. In
order to increase the amount of deuterium produced, the partially-
enriched hydrogen from each stage was burned and the resulting
water recycled to the earlier stages, The
facility could sly product of various concentrations, up
to pure (> 99.5%) D20, and was the largest producer in the
world. Between the start of operations in late 1934 and 1938,
40 kilograms of heavy water were produced. By late 1939 heavy
water production uas about ten kilograms a month, and the
inventory of pure D20 was about 185 kilograms. But this
is getting a little ahead of our story.
Besides electrolysis and fractional distillation of liquid
hydrogen, early experiments indicated that fractional distilla-
tion of water, gaseous diffusion, adsorption on surfaces, and
isotopically selective chemical reactions might be used to
separate deuterium.14 In particular, Farkas and Farkas 5
pointed out that the equilibrium constant of the isotopic
exchange reaction between hydrogen and water
-6-
HD + H20 HDO + H2 (1)
differs sufficiently from unity at low temperatures to
permit effective separation. Unfortunately, because of the
low solubility of hydrogen gas in water the approach to equi-
librium in this reaction is a slow process, and it was realized
that catalysis would be required for its practical utilization.
However, because of the availability of sufficient heavy water
for laboratory studies via electrolysis, none of these al-
ternative methods were actively pursued until the discovery
of fission suddenly made the need for large amounts of pure
D20 a matter if high priority.
The discovery which led directly to the convergence be-
tween the neutron and heavy water had initially nothing to do
with either. In January 1934;16 Irene Curie and Frederic
Joliot observed that when the light elements beryllium, boron,
and aluminium were bombarded with alpha particles, positrons
were emitted, and that the emission continued after the alpha
source was turned off. At the Physics Institute of the Uni-
versity of Rome, Enrico Fermi reasoned that this artificial
radioactivity might be induced more effectively by the neutral
neutron than the charged alpha particle, and in March 1934--
in collaboration with a brilliant research team which eventually
included E. Amaldi, . D'Agostino, B. Pontecono, F. Rosetti,
and E. Segr6--he began a systematic study of artificial radio-
activity produced by neutron bombardment. The behavior of
-7-
both light and heavy elements, including uranium, was investi-
gated, and although the discovery of uranium fission was
missed- 7 this work laid the foundation for the field of neutron
physics, stimulated the efforts of other researchers in the US,
Europe, and Japan, and won a Nobel prize for Fermi in 1938.
Early in the research program, Amaldi and Pontecorro accidentally
discovered that silver irradiated on wood tables became much
more active than when it was irradiated on other marble tables
in the same room. To clear up the mystery, preparations were
made for systematic observations involving; e.g., the effect
on the activation of interposing a lead filter between the
neutron source and the detector. As recounted by Segr~l
That morning [October 22, 1934] Fermi suddenly
decided to try filters of light elements instead
of the prepared lead filter. Paraffin was tried
first. Although the experiment was performed
during the examination period and several of us
were absent, our friends Persico and Rossi were
kibutzing on our work. About noon, we were all
summoned to watch the miraculous effects of the
filtration by paraffin. At first I thought that
some counter had gone wrong because such strong
activities had seldom appeared before. But it
was immediately demonstrated that this strong
activation was the result of filtering the
radiation producing the radioactivity through
paraffin. All this happened around noon. We
tried a few more substances as filters and
recognized that the powerful effect occurred only
with paraffin. We went to lunch extremely puzzled
by our observations and came back around three
o'clock, after our usual siesta, to find that
Fermi in the meantime had found the explanation
of the strange behavior of filtered neutrons.
He hypothesized that the neutrons could be
slowed down by collisions and in this way become
more effective, an idea which was contrary to
our expectations.
-8-
Fermi himself later described the circumstances surrounding
the seminal discovery in a conversation with S.C. Chandrasekhar1 9
I will tell you how I came to make the discovery
which I suppose is the most important one I have
made. We were working very hard on the neutron-
induced radioactivity, and the results we were
obtaining made no sense. One day, as I came to
the laboratory, it occurred to me that I should
examine the effect of placing a piece of lead before
the incident neutrons. And instead of my usual
custom, I took great pains to have the piece of
lead precisely machined. I was clearly dissatis-
fied with something: I tried every excuse to
postpone putting the piece of lead in its place.
When finally, with some reluctance, I was going
to put it in its place, I said to myself, 'No, I
do not want this piece of lead here; what I want
is a piece of paraffin.' It was just like that:
with no advanced warning, no conscious, prior,
reasoning. I immediately took some odd piece
of paraffin . . . and placed it where the piece
of lead was to have been.
The discovery of the "hydrogen effect" and Fermi's hypothesis
to explain it were reported immediately in a note to the Italian
journal Ricera Scientifica;2 0 subsequent experiments confirmed
that the results could be explained on the basis that: 21
(a) the scattering of neutrons by protons occurs as if
both are elastic spheres. It immediately follows that in
a collision with a proton at rest, an energetic neutron can
lose a variable, but in general large fraction of its kinetic
energy. Therefore, provided the cross section for elastic
scattering is much larger than cross section for neutron
capture by the proton, the energy of the neutron can be
reduced enormously by a succession of random elastic collisions
with the hydrogen nuclei of the "moderator"--as substances
-9-
which slowed down neutrons came to be known--before being
captured in the target nucleus.
(b) when the velocity v of a neutron is such that its
deBrogliewavelength A =(mv) - 1 (m = neutron mass) is large
compared with the range of the nuclear force, the probability
P that the neutron will be absorbed or captured by the nucleus
should be independent of v. Expressing P as a function of the
2
capture cross section aa (cm2), the neutron density n (number
3
per cm ), and v
P =n -v a or (2)
P 1
(a - - (3aa n v (3)
one arrives as the so-called "1 -law; i.e., a capture
cross section for slow neutrons iversely proportioned to the
velocity of the neutron. This reslt is equivalent to the
statement that the mean life of slow neutrons against capture in
3 _
a medium of m nuclei per cm3, = (m * aa v) 1 · should
be independent of velocity.
Deviations from the "--law" ere subsequently found by
v
Fermi and other workers. The phenomena could be explained
by postulating the existence of relatively narrow absorption
bands characteristic of various elements in which neutrons of
definite velocity or energy (groups) would be selectively
captured. The analysis of the neutron energy spectrum into
-10-
groups which are approximately homogeneous with respect to
their absorption properties proved to be very fruitful.
Heavy water entered this picture quite naturally. That
is, given the billard-ball collision model of the slowing down
of neutrons in hydrogenous substances, one should expect a
similar, though less pronounced effect with substances of
higher atomic weight. Besides atomic weight, the magnitude
of the slowing-down effect should also depend on the elastic
scattering cross section since, roughly speaking, the neutron
cannot be slowed down if it doesn't interact strongly with
the moderating nuclei. To test this hypothesis, the relative
efficiency of H20 and D20 in slowing down neutrons and hence
enhancing the artificial radioactivity produced in silver was
investigated by several experimental groups in 1935.
In particular, Dunning and co-workers at Columbia2 2 found a
relative H20 to D2 0 enhancement of 5.5, and concluding that
this was too large to be explained on the basis of the dif-
ference in atomic weight between H and D, they ascribed the
effect to a much smaller interaction between neutron and
deuteron than between neutron and proton. The paper re-
ported fast and slow neutron-nucleus collision cross sections
measurements for practically all the elements in the periodic
table; however, the experimental procedure gave only the sum
of the elastic scattering and capture components of the total
cross section, and hence it was not clear to what extent the
-11-
slowing down process in the lighter elements was effected
by the competition between scattering and capture. This
was largely resolved over the next two years by the work
of Fermi and his co-workers in Italy, Frisch, Halban, and
Koch in Denmark, and Kikuchi, Aki, and Takeda in Japan.
Fermi, in a theoretical treatment of the problem of slow neutron
capture by a proton with the formation of a deuteron and the
emission of a y quantum,23 showed that the assumption that
the process takes place via oscillation of the magnetic moment
of the neutron-proton system leads to a value fr the neutron
mean life against capture in agreement with the experimental
.24
result measured a few months previously by his group.24 In
further work with Amaldi,25 he determined a value for the capture
-24 2
cross section of 0.31 x 10 cm at a neutron velocity of
2.5 x 105 cm sec 1. The important experiments of Frisch et al.26
not only confirmed this result, but also gave upper bounds for
the slow neutron capture cross section of deuterium, carbon,
and oxygen of 0.03, 0.01, and 0.01 x 10 24cm2 , respectively.
Kikuchi et al.27 independently arrived at the same upper bound
for capture by deuterium, but their work does not seem to have
been as widely known as that of Frisch.
In summary, by the time that uranium fission was dis-
covered late in 1938 by Hahn and Strassman,2 8 heavy water
could be obtained in relatively small ( kilogram) quantities
at a high price,29 and much work had been done to ascertain
its physical, chemical and biological properties. Its efficacy
-12-
as a neutron moderator vis vis ardinary water and carbon
was less well known. However, it was obviously better than
carbon in its slowing down power, and the evidence of low
capture cross sections for deuterim and oxygen obtained by
Frisch et al. indicated a clear and perhaps marked superiority
in this respect as compared with 120. The practical significance
of having better answers to these questions would soon be ap-
parent.
-13-
1.2 Fission and the War
Despite its efficacy as a neutron moderator, the basic
role that heavy water played in the historic effort to build
an atomic bomb during World War II was that of an understudy,
waiting in the wings should other methods for producing the
required fissionable material fail. After some important
early work in France and England on chain reactions in
homogeneous mixtures of natural uranium and heavy water, the
decision was made to centralize the Allied bomb effort in
the U.S., and here a decision to pursue vigorously the
possibility of graphite rather than heavy water moderation
in a natural uranium reactor to produce plutonium had been
made early and was ultimately successful. The two main
scientific actors in this decision, Fermi and the brilliant
Hungarian physicist, Leo Szilard, were not unaware of the
virtues of heavy water. However, given the felt urgency to
proceed, and the greater availability of large amounts of
graphite of the required purity as compared with heavy water,
it seemed logical to first try the former. This came after the
demonstration by the Columbia University group led by Fermi
and Szilard as well as by the French team of Joliot and his
co-workers that ordinary water captured too many neutrons to
maintain a self-sustaining chain reactor with natural uranium.
Given the subsidiary role that heavy water played, it is not
surprising that most accounts of the history of the bomb--
especially those written from a US perspective--concentrate on
those techniques which were ultimately successful in producing
-14-
fissile materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium.
However, both the political and technical aspects of the
heavy water story during this period have been treated in
13, 30 31, 2
some detail in several books; herb we 'setch briefly the key
element of the story and refer to these books and the original
sources for further information.
As a result of the intense scientific activity which
was sparked by the discovery of uranium fission in December
1938, by the following June it was known that:
(1) On the average, between two and three neutrons
are emitted per fission
(2) Practically all the fission is due to the interaction
of slow neutrons with the uranium isotope U-235, which is
present in natural uranium at an abundance relative to the
isotope U-238 of roughly 1:139
(3) Capture of neutrons by natural uranium takes place
primarily via resonance absorption in the U-238 nucleus at
energies above thermal to form U-239.
This immediately implied that:
(1) A chain reaction was possible, in principle.
(2) Since U-235 fissionsprimarily via interaction with
slow neutrons, conditions for a chain reaction would be facili-
tated by mixing natural uranium with a moderator to slow the
neutrons emitted during the fission process from energies on
the order of 1 Mev to energies in the thermal range.
(3) U-238, which forms the bulk of natural uranium, is
a "nuisance" from the viewpoint of achieving a chain reaction
-15-
in that the resonance absorption process removes some of the
neutrons which would ultimately fission in U-235 were they
not captured in U-238 while being slowed down by the moderator.
(At this time it was not yet appreciated that the capture
process leads to the formation of a new element, plutonium
42(Pu-239), which itself could undergo slow neutron fission.)4
The obvious moderator to try was light water (H20). In
parallel but independent experiements during the next several
33
months Anderson, Fermi, and Szilard at Columbia and Halban,
34
Joliot, Kowarski, and Perrin in Paris investigated the possi-
bilities of a chain reaction in a uranium-water system. The
nub of the problem was to determine if there existed a water-
to-uranium ratio which minimized the combined effect of the
two principal neutron loss mechanisms--absorption of thermal
neutrons by the water, which effect increases as this ratio
~- is increased, and resonance absorption of neutrons before they
are slowed down to thermal energies, which increases as the
ratio is decreased--to the extent that the neutron gain via
fission exceed the loss and made a chain reaction possible.
Unfortunately, the work of both groups indicated that light
water absorbed too many neutrons to support a chain reaction,
and their attention turned to heavy water and carbon. However,
by this time (September 1939), war had broken out in Europe,
and scientists in France, Germany, and Britain subsequently
withheld publication on research relating to fission in
general, and the efficacy of moderators other light water, in
-16-
particular. In France, Joliot and his colleagues made
detailed reference to the favorable properties of heavy
water for the first time in a sealed note deposited with the
35
Paris Academy of Sciences on October 30, 1939. They ob-
served that the fact that D20 was not as effective as H20 in
slowing down neutrons was not crucial, since its low absorption
cross section meant that a high. D20/U ratio could be used,
and this in turn would decrease the resonance absorption in
U-238. Their optimism about attaining a chain reaction in
a heavy water-uranium system--especially for a heterogeneous
arrangement of spheres of moderator in a mass of uranium which
would decrease the resonance absorption effect as compared
with a homogeneous mixture--was tempered by the realization
that obtaining enough heavy water would be very expensive.
This same thought was expressed by Fermi in corresponsence
with Sz.ilard in July 1939. In reply to Szilard's suggestion
that:
If carbon should fail, our next best guess
might be heavy water, and I have therefore
taken steps to find out if it is physically
possible to obtain a few tons of heavy water.
Heavy hydrogen is supposed to have a capture
cross section below 0.03, and the scattering
cross section ought to be 3 or 4 times 10-24
for neutrons above the 1 volt region. Since
heavy hydrogen slows down about as efficiently
per collision as ordinary hydrogen, and since
hydrogen has a capture cross section of 0.27
and a scattering cross section of 20, heavy
hydrogen is more favorable.36
Fermi was cautious:
-17-
I have discarded heavy water as too
expensive; but if you can easily get
several tons of it, it might work
very nicely.37
This ambivalence concerning D0 was based on the knowledge2
that even if a chain reaction were theoretically possible in
a system which utilized natural uranium, the amount of moderator
required ight be very large; e.g., on the order of hundreds
of tons. While obtaining such quantities was conceivable in the
case of graphite, tons of heavy water seemed out of the ques-
tion. Fermi and Szilard therefore concentrated their efforts
on exploring the feasibility of the uranium-graphite system; an
important milestone in this effort was a measurement of the
neutron absorption of graphite by Fermi and Anderson in the
spring of 1940,38 using very pure graphite procured from the
National Carbon Company through Szilard's efforts. The cross
-27 2
section proved to be very small, 3x10 cm , and this re-
inforced the optimism at Columbia concerning the prospects
for a chain reaction in the uranium-graphite system. Although
reluctant at first to do so, Fermi eventually agreed with
Szilard's request that this result be kept secret39 As a
result, German scientists working on atomic research were not
led to question an incorrect measurement of the diffusion
length of slow neutrons in graphite by Bothe and Jensen in
am ~~~~40January 1941 which indicated that neutron absorption was
too great for graphite to be used as a moderator. Thereafter
German atomic pile research for the remainder of the war
focused on the use of heavy water as a moderator, but the
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effort was continually frustrated by their failure--thanks
largely to Allied efforts --to obtain the needed quantities.
The problem of getting sufficient D20 was also preoccupying
41Joliot and his colleagues in France. Tons were not to be had
anywhere, but as previously indicated, practically the entire
world's supply, approximately 185 kg, was relatively close at
hand in Norway, where it comprised the D20 inventory of the
Norsk-Hydro Co. This quantity would certainly be insufficient
for a self-sustaining system, but it might be enough to measure
the magnitude of the infinite multiplication factor for such a
system, and thus indicates just how much D20 would needed to
attain criticality. In November 1939, Joliot proposed to
M. Raoul Dautry, the French Minister of Munitions, that the
entire stock, worth approximately $120,000, be purchased
or borrowed. An air of urgency was added to the request when
the French subsequently learned that in January 1940, a repre-
sentative of the German firm I.G. Farben had also tried to
persuade Norsk Hydro to sell it all its heavy water stock,
and moreover, to boost production then running at 10 kg per
month, to satisfy a German need for 100 kg per month. (Both
I.G. Farben and the Bank of Paris and the Low Countries owned
stock in the Norwegian Company; indeed, the French Bank had
a majority interest.) The task of obtaining Norsk Hydro's
inventory of heavy water for Joliot was entrusted to M. Jacques
Allier of the French Secret Service, who was also an officer
of the Bank of Paris. Travelling in great secrecy to avoid
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detection by German intelligence, Allier went to Oslo in
March 1940 where he succeeded in convincing Axel Aubert, the
managing director of Norsk Hydro, to loan France its entire
185 kg inventory of D2 0 for the duration of the war. Under
cloak-and-dagger circumstances, twenty-six cans of heavy water
were subsequently flown out of Norway to Scotland and then on
to Paris, where Joliot and his colleagues set up an experiment
to determine whether a divergent reaction is possible in a
homogeneous mixture of uranium oxide and heavy water. A
rough estimate of the neutron absorption corss section of
heavy water was made, but in the face of the German invasion
of France in May 1940, the experiment was dismantled, and the
heavy water began its exit from France to England in the same
dramatic fashion as it has previously entered from Norway.
The first leg of the journey was from Paris to Clermont-
Ferrand in central France, where it was hoped that the experi-
mental work could be continued. However, as the military situa-
tion worsened, it was decided to move the heavy water to
Bordeaux where on June 18 it left for England on a small coaler,
accompanied by Halban and Kowarski but not Joliot. The French
team was installed by the Maud Committee 42 in the Cavendish
Laboratory at Cambridge where they continued their work on
the homogjeneous uranium oxide-heavy water system begun in France.
Their experimental arrangement consisted of a mixture of
variable amounts of U308 powder suspended in 112 liters of
D20 inside a 60 cm diameter aluminum sphere spinning at 20 rpm
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to prevent the U308 from settling at the bottom, and surrounded3 8
by a liquid hydrocarbon. A radium-beryllium neutron source
was placed at the center of the system, and measurements of
neutron intensity were taken at various distances from the
center. The volume integral of the activity of the neutron
detectors was measured in the hydrocarbon surrounding the
sphere, with or without the uranium-heavy water mixture in-
side. In December 1940, Halban and Kowarski found an
increase in the activity when the heavy water-uranium mixture
was present. This implied that the infinite multiplication
factor for such a system, k, was greater than one; and hence
that a divergent chain reaction was possible. However, the
experimental uncertainties in the calculated value for k,
1.18 + 0.07, left open the question of how much heavy water
would be needed for a reactor of finite size. If Halban and
Kovarski were correct, "only" a few tons might be enough.
In any case, the Maud Committee scientists were sufficiently
encouraged to communicate the result in January 1941, to
Harold Urey, a member of the Briggs Uranium Committee,
and the person in the US most likely to lend a sympathetic
ear to their request for an American effort to find ways of
producing large quantities of heavy water. In this manner, the
bator) was passed to the U.S. as far as heavy water work was
concerned, and remained there until the end of the war. We
discuss the later developments after brief mention of the
German wartime heavy water work.43German wartime heavy water work.
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Although the heavy water inventory of Norsk-Hydro had
eluded them, the Germans were in a good position to capitalize
on the fact that the Vemork plant had fallen into their hands
with the occupation of Norway in May 1940. By this time, the
efficacy of heavy water as a moderator--particularly in a
heterogeneous arrangement with natural uranium--was well
appreciated; the idea having occurred to several German
scientists; Paul Harteck and Werner Heisenberg in particular,
during the fall of 1939.
Harteck, one of the key figures in the German atomic bomb
effort, had gained first-hand knowledge of heavy water pro-
duction via electrolysis while working under Lord Rutherford
at the Cavendish Laboratory in England in 1934. Moreover,
he and his colleague Hans Suess had also investigated the
hydrogen-steam isotopic exchange reaction as a means of con-
centrating deuterium several years before. In the development
of this and other processes, they could count on the heavy
water expertise of the physicist Karl Wirtz and the physical
chemist Karl-Fredrich Bonhoeffer, as well as the highly
sophisticated German chemical engineering industry. The Ger-
man's first action was to request Norsk Hydro to increase the
heavy water output at Vermork to 1.5 tons a year. However,
when Bothe's erroneous measurement seemingly closed the door
on the use of graphite as a moderator, increased production
of heavy water became a pressing concern. Various new methods
were considered: fractional distillation of water, of hydro-
gen, and increasing the Norwegian production by modifications
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at Vemork; these included expanding the high concentration
plant and using the hydrogen-steam isotope exchange
process to strip a major fraction of the deuterium from the
evolved hydrogen gas and cause it to be returned to the electro-
lytic cell. Water distillation was rejected as too expensive,
but it was decided to pilot the hydrogen distillation process,
and press ahead with the Vemork plant modifications. On the
basis of an exponential experiment in May 1942, similar in
concept to that of Halban and Kowarski but involving a hetero-
geneous instead of a homogeneous arrangement of uranium metal
powder and heavy water, Professors Dopel
and Heisenberg estimated that about five tons of heavy water
would be needed for a critical reactor. By June 1942, only
800 kilograms had been delivered, but in September a set of
exchange reactors containing a nickel catalyst developed by
Harteck and Suess were installed at stage six of the Vemork
plant. Similar modifications were planned for the fourth and
fifth stages; with these improvements the Germans expected
production to reach 400 kilograms a month. Unfortunately--
for the German atomic effort--the Allies had been aware of
the Germrlan interest in Vemork heavy water ever since their
attemrnpL to buy its inventory in January 1940. The ensuing
developmients were followed by British intelligence with
increasing concern, and in July 1942, the War Cabinet in London
authorized Combined Operations to lay plans for a ground attack
to destroy the heavy water plant. The ensuing operations
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involving great daring, skill and fortitude are the stuff of
which popular histories and Hollywood movies are made.
Unhappily, the initial effort in November 1942 was aborted
when two gliders carrying thirty-four commandos crash-landed
in sourthern Norway. Though German intelligence was thus
alerted to the mission's objective--the survivors having been
interrogated before being executed--and measures taken to
harden the defenses around Vemork, a second operation mounted
in February 1943 by a small Norwegian sabotage team which had
_- been trained in England succeeded in destroying all the elec-
trolytic cells of the high concentration plant. The equiva-
lent of 350 kilograms of heavy water was lost, and partial
production could not be resumed until June. The Germans
recognized the vulnerability of operations in Norway to further
destruction, and intensified their efforts to produce heavy
water in Germany using various methods. Their fears proved
justified; in a bombing attack by the American Eighth Air
Force stationed in Britain in November 1943, the hydrogen
electrolysis plant and associated power station were hit, and
without electric power the undamaged high concentration cells
had to be shut down. Reading the handwriting on the wall, it
was decided to dismantle this equipment, and ship it along
with the remaining heavy water to Germany. The importance
of the latter, in particular, caused the Germans to take
special precautions; but the Allies were equally resolute,
and the coup de grace was delivered in February 1944 whenand the coup de grace was delivered in February 1944 when
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a ferry carrying the heavy water across Lake Tinnsjo in
Norway was sunk by plastic explosives attached to her bows.
With the severing of the Norwegian connection, German
scientists were left with approximately two-and-a-half tons
of heavy water for use in their ongoing efforts to construct
a critical reactor, and ambitious plans to develop new sources
using four alternative processes: low pressure water distilla-
tion, liquefication and distillation of hydrogen, catalytic
hydrogen-steam exchange, and a new technique which had been
developed by K. Geib involving isotopic exchange between
hydrogen sulphide and water, a reaction which did not require
catalysis. The heavy water effort was spearheaded by Harteck,
but it came to nothing because of the rapidly deteriorating
war situation-and a lack of priority. According to Irving:44
The lack of priorities behind heavy-water
plant construction stemmed from a lack of
resolution; and the Germans' lack of resolution
stemmed from an unspoken belief that before
any heavy-water plant could be build, their
isotope-separation experts might have found
a way to enrich the rare isotope uranium-235.
Harteck himself had ingenuously advised the authorities that
In all probability quantities of enriched 38-
preparation [uranium] can be produced, which
will effect a significant reduction in the
SH-200 [heavy water] requirement. Whether
enough enriched 38-preparation can be produced
to dispense with SH-200 altogether remains
to be seen.
In the US the attitude towards heavy water production was
similar, although the rationale was based on the favorable
outlook for graphite as a moderator in a reactor to produce
plutonium rather than the use of enriched uranium as fuel.
-
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As in Germany a variety of production processes were investi-
gated, but the end result was different; enough heavy water
was available by mid-1944 for a small heterogeneous reactor
to reach criticality, something the Germans never achieved.
As previously noted, the dormant American interest in heavy
water was reawakened in January 1941 by the news of Halban and
Kowarski's encouraging results.45 Studies of large scale pro-
duction methods were initiated by Urey at Columbia in collabor-
ation with Prof. H. Taylor of Princeton, a physical chemist
and one of the pioneers in American heavy water research.
Taylor had done experiments on the electrolytic production
of heavy water and the exchange reaction between deuterium
and water vapor on surfaces as early as 1934, and so was well
placed to investigate both the details of the latter process,
and how it could be used to make heavy water efficiently by
stripping the deuterium from large streams 6f electrolytic
hydrogen and feeding it back into the electrolytic cells,
the same idea that Harteck and Suess were planning to imple-
ment at Vemork. During 1941, Taylor and his research team
studied Urey's suggestion that the hydrogen-water isotopic
exchange process be implemented by countercurrent flow of the
two substances in a tower packed with a suitable catalyst;
in orJder o make the electrolytic-hydrogen connection, in late
1941 he went to Trail, British Columbia and convinced the
management of the ammonia synthesis plant there--the largest
source of electrolytic hydrogen in North America--that it
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would be practical to incorporate the necessary heavy-water
production equipment without disturbing plant operations.
Studies of the exchange reaction at Princeton and by the
Standard Oil Development Co. demonstrated that, even with
the best catalysts, the overall reaction rate was slow, and
hence probably governed by the diffusion of hydrogen through
water to and from the catalytic surface, a very slow process
compared with the actual catalysis. In support of this hypothe-
sis, it was also shown that in contact with various catalysts,
the exchange reaction between hydrogen and water vapor at
atmospheric pressures occurred at much higher rates than that
obtainable using liquid water. This work eventually led to
the use of hydrogen-water vapor exchange at the Trail plant
in an ingenious system invented by Frank Barr of the Standard
Oil Co. A single stage of exchange was carried out in two
steps, first equilibriating a water vapor-hydrogen mixture
with water, and then passing the mixture over a catalyst where
the exchange reaction between water vapor and hydrogen took
place. This mixture was again equilibrated with water, and
the process repeated. The water flowed countercurrent to the
hydrogen-water vapor stream, so that all the effects of a
countercurrent system were realized. The decision to pro-
ceed with heavy water production at Trail was made
in May 1942, and construction started in September
1942. The primary exchange plant was designed to enrich the
natural feed water at Trail which contained 0.0138% D to a
-27-
concentration of 2.14% D. Finishing was accomplished in a
secondary electrolytic plant whose product was 99.8% D0.
Heavy water was first produced at Trail in June 1943, but
because of the long equilibrium time of this process (approxi-
mately eight months) and losses from the primary electrolytic
cells, production near the design rate of 0.55 tons per month
was slow in coming: only 0.25 tons was produced by the end
of 1943, and 85% of design by September 1944. However, in
December 1942, even before the first heavy water was produced,
the leaders of the Manhattan District decided that another
source should be developed and--acting on the recommendation
of the DuPont Company--choose vacuum distillation of water
as the production technique. This, on the basis that it
afforded the most reliable technology, which could be imple-
mented without the need for pilot plant operations. In addi-
tion, although considerably more expensive than the Trail
process, this technique provides a potentially unlimited supply
of product, since the source of deuterium is ordinary water,
not electrolytic hydrogen as at Trail. In January 1943, DuPont
started construction of three distillation plants at the site
of ordnance works in Virginia, Alabama, and Indiana, where
excess steam capacity for the process was available. The
plants were completed on schedule by November 1943, but the
average production during their two years of operation was
only about 50% of design or 1.2 tons/month, primarily because
of high plate leakage.
-28-
This level of activity did not satisfy all the pro-
ponents of heavy water, particularly Urey, who were dubious
about the workability of the massive graphite-moderated piles
at Hanford and the gaseous-diffusion method for enriching
uranium. For example, as late as February 1944, Szilard was
complaining that
The scientists in Urey's laboratory were
of the opinion that the [water distillation]
process chosen by DuPont was much more cost-
ly and inefficient from the point of view of
coal consumption than another method . . .
It was impossible, however, to collaborate
with any firm other than duPont in the develop-
ment of the alternative method. As a result
of this our heavy water production does not
exceed three tons a month and consumes 30,000
tons of coal per ton. The quantity of heavy
water produced is not sufficient as a basis of
adequate production of U2 33 or as a second line
of defense for the production of plutonium.
The production is expensive and we have no
alternative method ready on which to fall
back if a larger quantity of heavy water is
needed or if economic conditions should com-
pel us to discontinue the inefficient process
used by duPont.
The other method alluded to by Szilard was the hydrogen sulphide-
water (H2S-H20) dual-temperature isotopic exchange process
which was developed by a member of Urey's research group,
Jerome Spevack, and dubbed the "S-Process" by the Manhattan
District. The principal advantages of this process are: (1)
like water distillation, it does not require catalysis, and( 2
it provides a potentially unlimited supply of heavy water,
but at a much cheaper price than the latter method. However,
Szilard's advocacy is a bit of hindsight, since at the time
the choice of a backup process to Trail was made in November
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1942, only limited laboratory data on the "S-Process" was
available and there were serious doubts about the feasibility
of a large plant, due to the toxic and corrosive nature of wet
H2S. Similar question marks; e.g., the limited experience
with the behavior of large-scale apparatus operating at 20
to 25°K, surrounded another potentially promising production
technique, distillation of liquid hydrogen. Both processes,
and especially H2S-H20 exchange, loom larger in post-war
heavy water developments, and will be discussed in the next
section. Szilard's remarks are symptomatic of the dissatis-
faction of the physics group at the Chicago Metalurgical-
Laboratory with the direction of the Manhattan District, in
general, and the major responsibilities given to DuPont, in
particular.
As far as the wartime role of heavy water was concerned,
the heart of the matter was the reliability of Halban and
Kowarski's 1940 experimental result, and here the matter was
effectively settled at a meeting between Urey and Fermi in
48
March 1943, three months after the first graphite pile had gone
critical, and with construction of the Hanford reactors under-
way. The lingering attraction of heavy water was the expecta-
tion that, if the French researchers were right, only about
ten tons would be required to attain criticality in a conceptually
simple homogeneous device consisting of a slurry of uranium
oxide in heavy water in which the latter could be circulated
to serve as both neutron moderator and coolant. However,
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Fermi's calculations for the homogeneous system--using Halban
and Kowarski's value for the heavy water slow neutron absorp-
tion cross section of 8 x 10 27cm2, and a rough estimate
of the resonance absorption in a homogeneous mixture--gave
a maximum value of 1.02 for;k,, the infinite multiplication
factor. If this value was close to the mark,4 9 a critical
system would require on the order of hundreds of tons of
heavy water. Although the calculations for a heterogeneous
system was much more promising; i.e., a k of 1.20, the
basic conclusion was that the serious disagreement between
Halban and Kowarski's experimental result for the homogeneous
system and Fermi's theoretical estimate called for a repetition
of their experiments using improved techniques, not a crash
program to make more heavy water. In June, Fermi irradiated
15 kilograms of heavy water from Trail in the CP-2 pile, and
confirmed that the neutron absorption was very low. This
result gave added impetus to the growing interest in heavy
water among the scientists in the Chicago MetaLurgi=l
Laboratory, and in August 1943, a decision was made to utilize
their talents in the design and construction of an experimental
low power, heterogeneous, heavy-water pile. The pile, CP-3,
went critical in May 1944 with 6.5 tons of heavy water, large-
ly from the DuPont water distillation plants, and was the
focus ot. the laboratory's research activities until the end
of the war.
In Montreal, where an Anglo-Canadian team had been set
up in 1942 under Halban's direction to pursue research on
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heavy-water moderated piles, the road to a heavy water reactor
was even longer. Of the many obstacles, the primary one was
a strong feeling among the leaders of the American project,
Bush, Conant, and Groves, that a free interchange of informa-
tion and materials among US and foreign scientists would give
too much away without appreciably aiding US interests.50 It
was only in April 1944, after the Quebec agreement formalizing
the terms of Allied cooperation had been signed by Churchill
and Roosevelt, and the English physicist John Cockcroft had
replaced Halban--mistrusted by the Americans--as Director of
the Montreal Laboratory, that an understanding was reached
which provided for American aid--including loans of heavy
water and uranium rods--in the design and construction of a
heavy water pile in Canada. Subsequently it was decided to
build a small Zero Energy Experimental Pile (ZEEP) before the
larger National Research Experimental (NRX) Reactor. Like
CP-3, both ZEEP and NRX were irrelevant to the war effort;
in fact, NRX did not go critical until July 1947 and ZEEP
first began operating in September 1945, a month after the
war ended.
While it is interesting to speculate on what might
have been if, for example, the Norsk Hydro heavy water
had been available to Fermi in the spring of 1940, the work
of scientists in many countries: France, the US, Canada,
Germany, and the Soviet Ynion had demonstrated that heavy
water was an effective moderator, and much insight had been
gained into the physics and engineering of heavy-water
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moderated reactors. Moreover, many potential methods for
economic production of heavy water had been examined,
and at least two promising candidates had been identified,
hydrogen distillation and dual-temperature hydrogen sulphide-
water isotopic exchange.
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1.3 The Post War Period
The efforts to develop efficient methods for the large
scale production of heavy water after the war were driven by
its utility as a moderator both in reactors for the produc-
tion of nuclear weapons materials and in power reactors for
electricity generation. The US and Canada have been the two
main actors. In the US, although the later application has
had its advocates, up to the present time only the former
has been implemented. In Canada, just the reverse has occurred;
i.e., the wartime work in Montreal led to the evolutionary
development of a commercial nuclear fuel cycle based on natural-
uranium fueled, heavy-water moderated and cooled power reactors.
We trace here these two strands of the post-war heavy water
story, beginning with the work in the US.
In 1945, there seemed to be no pressing need for more
heavy water. The Allies were victoriouswith the US having
sole possession of the bomb, and the cold war had not yet
begun in earnest. In these circumstances, the plutonium production
capability of the Hanford piles seemed adequate, and possible
commercial applications requiring heavy water were distant.
Accordingly, the DuPont water distillation plants were shut
down in October 1945, having produced about 23 tons of heavy
water unt:il that time. (The Canadian plant at Trail produced
about 9 tons up to October 1945, and was shut down in 1956 be-
cause the hasty wartime marriage between the existing electro-
lyte hydrogen facility and the heavy water add-on could not
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produce heavy water efficiently.)
The situation changed dramatically in August 1949 with
the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb. Interest in
p
the possibility of thermonuclear weapons revived, and Edward
Teller's optimism regarding the chances for success in achiev-
ing this goal if enough tritium was available, prompted
Luis Alvarez and Ernest Lawrence to press the Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC), for the construction of a heavy water re-
51
actor.51 The controversy surrounding the wisdom of a crash
program to develop the "superbomb" was heated52ut both sides
were agreed that construction of heavy water reactors was
desirable.5 3 Not only could such reactors produce tritium
via capture of neutrons in the deuterium nuclei of the heavy
water moderator or, more practically, by neutron irradiation
of the lithium isotope Li, but the copious supply of free
neutrons above that required to maintain criticality also
made possible more efficient plutonium production than in
natural uranium graphite-moderated reactors which are only
barely critical. This flexibility would be important if
thermonuclear explosives should turn out not to be possible,
and was a critical element in the decision of the AEC in May 1950
to pursue the heavy water reactor route to increased production
of weapons materials. The work on reactor design under Walter
Zinn at Argonne,where CP-3 had been constructed, and the Canadian
experience with the NRX reactor at Chalk River gave confidence
that efficient heavy water production reactors could be built;
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the major concern was the availability of the required quanti-
ties of heavy water. In anticipation of this need, the AEC
had already indicated its interest in two potential production
Processes, hydrogen distillation and hydrogen sulphide-water
dual temperature exchange, both of which had been investigated
in both the US and Germany during the war. The Girdler Co.
was asked to design and operate a pilot plant and to design a
40 ton/year production plant based on the hydrogen sulphide-water
process, utilizing improvements on the wartime technology which
47
were suggested by the US developer of the process, J. Spevack.47
Hydrocarbon Research, Inc. was asked to make design and feasi-
bility studies for a plant based on the hydrogen-distillation
process using the synthesis gas of a large synthetic-ammonia
plant as feed. The DuPont Co. entered this picture in June ]950,
since its mandate as prime contractor for the project to expand
weapons materials production via heavy water reactors at
Savannah River, South Carolina included responsibility for
selecting and providing the necessary heavy water production
54facilities.54 DuPont considered three processes: hydrogen-
sulfide-water (or GS for Girdler-Spevack as it became known),
hydrogen distillation, and water distillation. The ultimate
choice of the GS process for primary deuterium concentration
was determined by the following considerations. Water distilla-
tion was too capital and energy-intensive, and the technology
maturity and adequacy of feed for hydrogen distillation on a
large scale were open to question. On the other hand, pilot
plant experience
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with the GS process indicated that the problems of corrosion,
toxicity and process control inherent in dual temperature
operation with wet hydrogen sulphide as the working fluid
could be overcome. Subsequently, two GS plants were built;
one at Dana, Indiana, the site of the Girdler pilot plant
and one of the DuPont wartime water distillation plants,
and the other at Savannah River. The plants differed some-
what in design and construction details, but both used the
GS process for enrichment from natural concentration to
approximately 15% D, with finishing to essentially pure
heavy water via water distillation followed by electrolysis.
The Dana Plant began operation early in 1952 and the Savannah
River plant about six months later. Although each plant was
designed for a capacity of 240 tons/year, each plant actually
achieved a production rate of almost 500 tons/year. By
1957, the peak demand for heavy water for production reactors
had passed, and the older Dana plant was shut down and later
dismantled. Subsequently, two-thirds of the GS units at
Savannah River were also shut down, as was the electrolytic
finishing unit. Now in its 27th year, the remaining third
still operates with finishing via distillation, to produce
about 70 tons of heavy water per year.
The declassification of large areas of US nuclear re-
search in 1955 in support of the Atoms for Peace Program
led to the release of detailed information on the US war-
time heavy water production efforts --with the exception of
the work on the "S-Process"--in the book edited by Murphy et al.45
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and in a comprehensive survey paper by M. Benedict at the
International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
55Energy held in Geneva in August 1955. In the latter,
discussion of the implementation of the GS process in the
US was limited to the fact that the heavy water plants of the
ACE used this process for primary concentration of deuterium,
and that heavy water product was available at $28 per pound.
These omissions,of course, were not accidental. Both Spe-
vack's original patent application in 1943, which was assigned
to the U.S. government since he had done the original work on
the "S-Process" while working for Manhattan Project, and his
subsequent application filed in 1950, which covered the
improvements in the process that were subsequently incor-
porated into the Dana and Savannah River Plants, were held
47
under Secrecy Order by the AEC until February 1957.47 At
that time, the AEC declassified details of the design and
operation of its plants, but Spevack obtained a court order
which delayed publication until his patent filed in 1950 was
issued in July 1959. Thereafter, the GS genie emerged from
the bottle with the publication of a comprehensive techni-
cal manual on heavy water production at the AEC plants56 as
well as more detailed studies of key aspects of the technology.
These developments were followed with much interest --
not only in the US where Spevack's battle with the AEC
became something of a cause celebre' -- but in foreign countries
which were considering heavy-water moderated reactors for
power production. By 1959, Canada, in particular, was well
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advanced towards this goal.57 Under the inspired leadership
of W. Bennett Lewis, who replaced Cockcroft as head of the
Canadian nuclear program in September 1946, reactor research
and development had progressed rapidly. Following ZEEP,
the zero power facility built at Chalk River under Kowarski"s
leadership which went critical in September 1945, came the
30MW heavy-water-moderated, light-water-cooled high flux
research reactor, NRX, which started up at Chalk River in
July 1947. NRX represented a quantum jump in technological
development, and its successful operation encouraged Lewis
in 19'51 to advance the feasibility of a nuclear-power effort
based on natural-uranium, heavy-water-moderated reactors.
To further this end, a Crown Corporation, Atomic Energy of
Canada, Limited (AECL) was commissioned in 1952. The next
rung up the technological ladder was the NRU reactor, commis-
sioned in November 1957. Its innovations included the possi-
bility of fueling while the reactor was operating, and the
use of heavy water as coolant as well as moderator in the
interest of minimizing neutron absorption in a reactivity-
limited natural uranium system. However, the crucial step
in the development of a commercially viable reactor was the
design of the Nuclear Power Demonstration Reactor (NPD).
The key features of the concept which finally evolved in
1956 were:
(1) the use of a pressure tube configuration in which
the high-pressure, high temperature heavy-water coolant is
physically separate from the low-pressure, low-temperature,
heavy-water moderator, and whose horizontal orientation facilitates
-39-
(2) bi-directional, on-power fueling utilizing short
bundles of zircalloy-clad, uranium dioxide fuel for maximum
burnup.
By the end of the decade, plans had been approved for
the construction of both the NPD and the first CANDU
(Canadian Deuterium Uranium) power plant, a 200 MWe unit at
Douglas Point, Ontario. If Douglas Point was to be the fore-
runner of an increasing commitment to nuclear power in Canada,
large amounts of heavy water would be needed, roughly one
metric ton per megawatt of installed capacity. In these
circumstances, it seemed prudent to AECL to implement the
GS technology in Canada, rather than to rely on purchases of
this strategic nuclear material from the US. It did not
have far to look for a strong advocate of this plan.
A delegate to the second Canadian Nuclear
Association Conference at Ottawa's Chateau
Laurier in May, 1962, might have noticed a
dark, powerfully built man moving purposefully
from one group to the next during receptions
and coffee breaks. He was often accompanied by
a charming wife and an attractive daughter.
His topic of conversation was always the same.
He spoke with enthusiasm, with suave persistence,
with absolute confidence...and always about 58
heavy water. The man was Jerome S. Spevack.
Actually, AECL already had access to the wartime "S-Process"
patent pursuant to the patent exchange provisions (Article IX)
of the agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of
atomic energy which Canada and the US signed in 1955. However,
no plant had ever been built to this patent alone. As noted,
the Savannah River and Dana GS plants were based on Spevack's
improvement patent which was issued in Canada in 1961.
This strong patent position was a major factor in dissuading
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major petrochemical firms such as DuPont of Canada and Cana-
dian General Electric from submitting formal proposals,
when in February 1963 the AECL called for competitive
bids for a 200 ton per year commercial heavy water plant.
A year later, the contract was awarded to Deuterium of
Canada, Ltd. (DCL), the wholly owned subsidiary of Spevack's
US Deuterium Corporation. The plant was to be built in
Glace Bay on Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, with AECL agreement
to purchase its product under condition that majority owner-
ship and control of DCL be vested in the Government of that
Province.47Thus began Canada's attempt to create a large
scale heavy water industry; unfortunately this chapter of
the CANDU story did not have an auspicious beginning.
Construction was delayed as a result of labor, construction
and vendor supply problems, and when startup operations at
the initial 200 tons per year plant began in November 1968,
it was discovered that the stainless steel tubes in the sea-
water-cooled heat exchangers were leaking from corrosion.
The original plant never operated, and was subsequently
rebuilt by Canatom Mon-Max. Opinions differ as to the reasons
for this fiasco. The conventional wisdom in Canadian and
U.S. heavy water circles, is that the basic problem was the
unworkability of some of the modifications of the GS techno-
logy as practiced at Savannah River and Dana which Spevack
incorporated into the Glace Bay design. In particular, the
use of sea water as feed and coolant and the use of the GS
process for finishing to reactor grade product as well as
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59for primary concentration from natural water feed. In reply,
Spevack has argued that the corrosion occurred because the
sea water coolant had been left in a stagnant condition in
tne involved heat exchanges for considerable periods of time
prior to startup; a circumstance of which he had no knowledge
or control. Moreover, there was no reason why the use of the
GS process for the final stages of deuterium concentration,
while unconventional, should not work in practice, and in
any event the latter stages were of minor significance in
terms of plant cost. Unfortunately, detailed analysis of
the relative merits of these arguments and related matters
would convey us too far afield. In any case, as a result
of "the muddle at Glace Bay" as well as startup problems
at a 400 ton per year GS plant built by Canadian General
Electric (CGE) at Port Hawkesbury, Nova Scotia, in the early
1970s AECL was forced to seek worldwide for sufficient heavy
water for the four 540 MWe reactors at the Pickering station
which were being commissioned at that time. The drought
finally ended with improved operation at Port Hawkesbury and
the start-up of an 800 ton per year GS plant, Bruce A, at
the Bruce Nuclear Power Development near Douglas Point.
Improvements in the GS process suggested by Proctor and Thayer
in 1962 60 were incorporated at both Port Hawkesbury and Bruce.
The prime contractor at both plants, the Lummus Company,
had also functioned as subcontractor at Savannah River.
Presently, the Bruce A, Port Hawkesbury, and the rehabilitated
Glace Bay plant are all operating, with a cumulative output
at 100% capacity of about 1600 tons per year, and another 800
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tons a year of capacity will soon be available from the Bruce
B plant, now being commissioned. With these developments
in mind, one is tempted to summarize the story of heavy
water production in Canada as "all's well that ends well."
However, the uphill battle to reach this goal supports the
proposition that efficient operation of transferred high
technology is not exclusively a problem for the "underdevel-
oped." As Dyne, et al., have cautioned with regard to
the prospects for regional fuel reprocessing,
Our experience with other nominally developed
technologies, heavy water production being an
example, is that they cannot be operated
efficiently in another country without the
host country having detailed technical
expertise in that technology.61
Besides Canada, many other countries have built and
operated heavy water-moderated research and demonstration
power reactors during the post-war period. Of these, the
country with the longest and most steadfast commitment to a
commercial fuel cycle based on natural uranium and heavy
water has been Canada's Commonwealth partner and nuclear
collaborator, India. In pursuit of this goal, and further
evolutionary developments including fast breeder reactors
utilizing plutonium cores and thorium blankets, a high
priority was placed on developing a self-sufficient indige-
nous capability in science, technology, and industry. Along
the way, personnel would be trained and technology acquired
abroad as necessary, but always with the aim of advancing
along the learning curve as rapidly as possible. The history
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of heavy water production in India is a textbook example
62
of how this policy has been pursued. When in 1954 the
Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) began heavy water
feasibility studies, information on only two processes was
available in the open literature, water distillation and
electrolysis. The former was rejected as too expensive,
while expert opinion regarding the latter was obtained by
hiring as a consultant, Dr. Jomar Brun, chief engineer of
the Vemork heavy water plant, which had resumed operations
after the war. Brun's study indicated that, even when
produced as a by-product of a fertilizer plant based on
electrolytic hydrogen, heavy water in India would be expen-
63
sive, about $100 per pound. However, with the disclosure
of information on various production processes at the 1955
55.
Geneva Conference, it became feasible to consider a wider
range of possibilities. The method finally chosen was
distillation of pre-enriched electrolytic hydrogen
produced for ammonia synthesis. Besides its inherent
advantages; e.g., igh deuterium recovery from feed and
low energy consumption, the choice of this process was
favored because of the experience which would be gained
by prior operation in France and Germany of two plants using
the same technology. In 1959, an agreement was signed with
the German company Linde to build a 14 ton per year plant
at Nangal, and the plant started up in 1962. However, by
this time it was clear that much more heavy water would be
needed to meet the needs of India's rapidly developing
nuclear program. Given the access to US GS technology
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available since 1959 via the technical literature and visits
to Savannah River, the logical step for a country wishing
to develop this technology indigenously would be to build a
pilot plant incorporating the improvements suggested by
Proctor and Thayer, while keeping a keen eye on Canadian
efforts in this area. In a paper presented at the 1964
64
Geneva Conference, it was announced that a GS pilot plant
had been constructed by DAE at Trombay, and design consider-
ations were given for a 200 ton per year plant using the GS
process for primary enrichment with either hydrogen or water
distillation comtemplated for final concentration. By
1970 these plans had changed somewhat; only 100 tons per
year was to be produced by the GS process; the difference to
be made up by other plants where heavy water production would
be effected by another isotopic exchange process, that
between hydrogen and ammonia. The hydrogen-ammonia exchange
reaction had been studied by Urey's research group during
the war, but was not considered promising because, like the
hydrogen-water system, no catalyst was available which per-
mitted counter-current operations with the ammonia in the
liquid phase. The discovery by Claeys, Dayton and Wilmarth
in 1950,65 that amide ion in liquid ammonia serves as an
efficient homogeneous catalyst for the reaction stimulated
research in this process by groups at the Brookhaven
National Laboratory in the US and the Commissariat a L'Energie
Atomique (CEA) in France. The French work led to the
operation of a pilot plant at Mazingarbe in 1957 and a
decision in 1964 to build a production plant at this site
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using this exchange reaction for primary enrichment with
final concentration by distillation of liquid ammonia. The
feed was synthesis gas (75% H2, 25% N2) from an associated
ammonia plant whose 500 ton per day capacity limited
neavy water production to about 26 tons per year. The
plant was brought into production in December 1967, and its
operation encouraged India to order in 1969 and in 1971 two
similar units from the French consortium, GBLPRA, one to be
built at Baroda and the other at Tuticorin, with annual design
capacities of 67 and 71 metric tons, respectively. Another
plant based on the ammonia-hydrogen exchange process
using a dual-temperature flowsheet rather than the mono-
67thermal mode favored by the French, was subsequently ordered
from the Ude Co. of West Germany, where research and develop-
ment, including pilot plant operations starting in the
early 1960s, had demonstrated the feasibility of dual-
temperature ammonia-hydrogen exchange for primary deuterium
enrichment. The Indian plant employing the Uhde process to
be built at Talcher, has a design capacity of 63 metric
68
tons per year.
Of the four Indian heavy water plants in various stages
of construction, the only one directly affected by the
Indian explosion of a nuclear device in May 1974 and the
subsequent break in Indo-Canadian nuclear collaboration was
the GS plant at Kota next to the Rajasthan Atomic Power
Station. Although considerable know-how concerning the
GS-process had been acquired by the DAE, certain key pieces
of equipment as well as the design engineering services
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were to be imported. With the sudden unavailability of
contracted assistance, the design engineering job was
given to an Indian firm, and needed equipment sought from
other suppliers. The progress of the Kota plant, in
particular, is being watched with great interest, since its
successful operation would add weight to the proposition
that, beyond a certain stage of technological development,
a cutoff in outside assistance can at most lead to delays,
added costs and troubled relations.
As of the Spring of 1979, however, all of the plants
under construction were experiencing difficulties. Accor-
ding to the then Prime Minister Moraji Desai 69
The technology of production is new and complex,
and the processes adopted were being used for
the first time in India, so the original
schedules could not be adhered to. This factor
and delays in the supply of equipment from
indigenous and foreign sources, problems of
transport of certain heavy equipment, failure
of some of this equipment, interruptions in power
supply, and events like strikes, are the main
reasons for the delay in the commissioning
of the heavy water plants.
70
According to more recent estimates, all four plants should
be producing heavy water by the end of 1981, and plans for
the construction of the next generations of plants are
underway.
In summary, the GS process is today the dominant process
for primary enrichment in large-scale ( hundreds of tons
per year) eavy water production. However, processes which
are based on extracting deuterium from ammonia synthesis
gas, such as hydrogen-ammonia a d hydrogen-amine exchange71gas, such as hydrogen-ammonia and hydrogen-amine exchange
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could be competitive, especially if the ammonia synthesis and
heavy water plants are designed together, and the capacity
of the former is large. For example, if the deuterium
recovery from a 1500 ton per day synthesis plant is 80%,
more than 100 tons per year of heavy water could be produced.
In this manner, depending on local conditions -- including the
relative availability of the technologies -- several parasitic
plants may be more advantageous than a single large GS plant.
Alternatively, it is possible to combine the advantages of
hydrogen-ammonia gas or hydrogen-amine exchange with the
unlimited capacity possible with a water feed by adding
either an ammonia-water or hydrogen-water step to these
non-aqueous systems. We discuss these so-called transfer
processes briefly in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.
Of course, the future large-scale use of heavy water72
in countries which have already made a commitment to the
natural uranium, heavy water fuel cycle; e.g., Canada,
India, and Argentina, will depend on the future growth of
nuclear energy in these countries, while its use in other
countries will depend on both this factor and the relative
attractiveness of the light and heavy water fuel cycles.
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details, see Chapter 3 , Section 3.2.1.
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2. Non-Proliferation Considerations
Thermal reactors which use heavy water as a neutron moderator
allow a variety of configurations depending on the choice of:
(1) the fissile material (U-235, U-233, or Pu239)
(2) the fertile material (U-238 or Th-232)
(3) a pressure tube or pressure vessel design
(4) on-power or off-power fuelling
(5) the coolant
(6) a direct or an indirect steam cycle.
Reactors embodying various combinations of these options
have been built. However, the one of most current interest is
the pressure tube, natural-uranium, on-power-fueled, heavy-
water-cooled reactor which has been developed and commercialized
in Canada, the CANDU. Here, we focus on the proliferation con-
siderations associated with this reactor and its associated
fuel cycle, with a brief discussion of some of the other pos-
sible reactor-types, in particular the pressure vessel, natural-
uranium, heavy-water-cooled reactor, which has been commercial-
ized in Argentina, and the pressure tube, mixed-oxide, light-
water-cooled reactor, a prototype of which is operating in
Japan.
2.1 The CANDU
Broadly speaking, the question of proliferation and the
CANDU can be divided into two parts: (1) how serious is the
threat of diversion of irradiated fuel, and (2) what are the
implications of the widespread utilization of a fuel cycle which
requires isotopic enrichment of the moderator but not the fuel?
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With regard to the former, the following issues have been
raised in the non proliferation literature:
(1) As compared with a light water reactor (LWR), on a
once-through fuel cycle normal operation of a CANDU produces
more plutonium in the spent fuel per kilowatt of electricity
generated, and CANDU plutonium emits fewer spontaneous fission (SF)
neutrons, which are widely cited1 as the cause of "pre-initiation" and
oonsequent nuclear explosive yield uncertainty and degradation.
(2) On-load fuelling implies enhanced capability for
covert diversion of fuel; in particular, for diversion of spent
fuel which has had a lower than design burnup in order to achieve
better weapons quality plutonium.
Witih regard to the latter, specific contentions have been
that:
(3) Since the sources of natural uranium are widespread,
the possessor of CANDUs can proliferate with relative impunity,
as compared with a nation that depends on supplies of enriched
uranium to operate LWRs.
(4) The CANDU fuel cycle provides a rationale for the
acquisition of large-scale heavy water production facilities,
and diversion of relatively small qualities of their product
would suffice for the construction of efficient, compact heavy-
water moderated reactors for the production of weapons materials.
We discuss each of these points in turn:
(1) At typical design burnups: 7,500 MWD/T in a CANDU,
33,000 MWD/T in a pressurized water reactor (PWR) and 27,500
A_
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MWD/T in a boiling water reactor (BWR), the total amount of
plutonium in the spent fuel of a CANDU is greater than that in
either LWR by about a factor of two. However, the quantities
in all cases are large compared to that needed for a weapon:
(-500 kg in a CANDU vs -260 kg in either LWR per gigawatt-year at
275% capacity; in addition, the plutonium concentration in the
2CANDU spent fuel is lower (0.4% vs 0.8-1% in an LWR), and this
means that more fuel must be reprocessed to obtain the same
quantity of plutonium. Mreover, the neutron background due to spon-
taneous fission of the even plutonium isotopes, pu- 238, pu-240, and Pu-242,
2is of the same order of magnitude (Table 1).
Table 1
Plutonium Composition of Spent Fuel at Discharge (%)
7,500 MWD/T 27,500 MWD/T 33,000 MWD/T
Isotope CANDU BWR PWR
Pu-238 0.1 1.0 1.5
Pu-239 68.4 57.2 55.7
Pu-240 25.6 25.7 24.5
Pu-241 4.6 11.6 13.4
Pu-242 1.4 4.5 4.9
Pu-238+240+242 27.1 31.2 30.9
SF Neutron 287 363 371
backgrourd
(n/s-g)
(2) Specifically, as regards production and diversion of high weapons-
quality; i.e., low-burnup plutonium, the conventional wisdom is that:
In contrast to the LWR, production of low
PU-240 in the CANDU does not involve a
significant loss of power output. 3
To put this question in perspective, we note that a 600M9e CANDU has
380 fuel channels each containing 12 fuel bundles,
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and each bundle contains 18.7 kg of uranium. On-load fuelling
is accomplished via two remotely controlled fuelling machines,
one at each side of the core. It is estimated that 300 fresh
bundles will be discharged from and a like number charged to
the reactor per month in a 600 MWe reactor. Although the
frequency and programming of these bundle changes has not yet
been firmly established --none of these reactors is yet in opera-
tion-- it is anticipated that the loading pattern will be similar
to the frequency and method of operation of the Pickering power
station. At Pickering, about 250 fuel bundles per month are
removed from and added to each of the 540 MWe reactors; these
bundles are changed on the day shift, Monday to Friday.
Eignt bundles are removed at a time, and the total refuelling
4
operation takes about six hours.
At the design burnup, the total plutonium content of the
irradiated fuel is about 3.8 gm Pu/kg U, so each irradiated
bundle contains approximately 70 gm Pu. Thus to obtain 8 kg
of reactor-grade plutonium -- which is considered to be a
quantity of safeguards significance by the IAEA5 -- approximately
112 bundles must be diverted. In order to get weapons-grade
quality material, i.e., an isotopic mixture containing on
the order of 95% Pu-239, the fuel burnup must be equal to or
less than 1000 MWD/T, at which the plutonium content is about
0.87 gm Pu/KgU. Thus to obtain 8 kg as before, about
8 kg Pu \ (0.87 gm Pu/kg U x bu18.7dlg U 490 bundles would be
bundle _40bnlswude
required. To what extent can either of these operations be
carried out covertly? The answer, quite obviously, depends
on the efficacy of the safeguards system. If there are
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no safeguards, or equivalentlya system which is not tamper-
proof and does not nave built-in redundancy protection in case
of normal equipment failure, then either operation is, in prin-
ciple, straightforward; e.g., without shutting down the reactor,
the required number of irradiated bundles would be remotely
removed from the reactor area, and shipped off site in
casks.
6Nonetheless, it has been suggested that the production
of low-burnup material in a CANDU might give a potential pro-
liferator pause even if there were no safeguards because
moving fuel bundles more rapidly than normal through some sub-set
of the fuel channels:
(1) might overtax the capacity of the fuelling machines
and lead to a loss of reactivity in the rest of the core.
(2) might produce hot spots in the core with a potential
danger of fuel melting due to the higher reactivity of the
fuel in the low-burnup channels.
Unfortunately, neither of these problems is insurmountable.
In the first place, as we have noted, normal fuelling of a CANDU
is accomplished during one six-hour shift, five days a week;
this suggests that machine availability for illicit operations
would not be a problem. Secondly, there are various ways of
avoiding potential hot-spot problems which will be obvious
to anyone with some knowledge of nuclear reactor physics and
engineering.
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An "obvious" and radical solution to the on-load fuelling
diversion problem is to eliminate on-load fuelling. While this
is feasible in enriched fuel or mixed-oxide designs; e.g., the
SGHWR or the FUGEN BLW, on-load fuelling is essential with natural
uranium whicn is highly reactivity limited. Moreover, off-
load fuelling does not obviate the need for effective safe-
guards since "unscheduled" reactor shutdowns to replace de-
fective fuel or some "fuel mismanagement" at the time of
scheduled refuellings create opportunities for the diversion of
irradiated fuel containing plutonium of high Pu-239 content.
A more rational approach to the on-load fuelling vulnerability
is to devise safeguards procedures tailored to the problem.
This has been done over the past several years by the Safeguards
Division of AECL, the Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board
(AECB), and the IAEA Department of Safeguards and Inspection.
A short description of their work follows; further details
can be found in references 7-10.
The basic premise underlying the CANDU safeguards scheme
is that the major concern is te plutonium contained in the
irradiated fuel, and that an approach which utilizes item
counting of irradiated fuel bundles and containment/surveillance
measures can insure timely detection of the unreported removal
of significant quantities of irradiated fuel:
(1) from the core by abnormal means, and
(2) from the spent fuel storage area, with the possible
-61-
substitution of dummy or unirradiated fuel.
To achieve this end, the safeguards scheme employs a
variety of instrumentation: TV surveillance systems, photo-
surveillance cameras, radiation yes-no monitors, bundle counters
for spent fuel, a "bundle verifier" for spent fuel trays, and
security seals and cages in a redundant fashion to minimize
tne effect of equipment failure. Briefly, the function of these
components is as follows (see Fig. 1).
(1) The surveillance cameras and the radiation yes-no
monitors in the reactor containment building verify that
irradiated bundles have not been removed from the core except
via the normal route which carries them past the bundle
counters and into the spent fuel storage bays. (There are
three bays: a receiving bay where the irradiated bundles are
remotely loaded onto the storage trays, and transferred into
the main storage bay. Defective fuel is first canned, and then
transferred via tne receiving bay to the defective fuel bay.)
In particular, four TV cameras observe all movements of the
fuelling machines and two film cameras and yes-no radiation
monitors are positioned to insure that irradiated fuel is not
diverted along the route normally taken by fresh fuel being
charged to the reactor. An additional film camera is used to
monitor various openings in the containment shell such as the
main airlock.
(2) The two bundle counters sense and record the number
of bundles passing from the reactor to the storage bays as well
as their direction of motion and the time of trainsfer.
(3) Seven TV cameras are positioned to observe the water
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surface, access doors, and other above-surface openings in the
spent fuel bays. Possible movement of irradiated material
through the water purification piping system is detected and
recorded by yes-no radiation monitors.
(4) In the main storage bay the following equipment is
utilized to secure irradiated bundles and to verify that dummies
have not been substituted.
(a) An array of gamma-sensitive diodes mounted
on a frame on which a loaded tray can be placed in
a manner which allows the activity of each bundle on
the tray to be verified.
(b) Stainless steel mesh cages, with covers, to
enclose a stack of spent fuel trays, and
(c) Ultrasonic seals, verifiable in situ under
water, to seal the cage covers.
At each routine IAEA inspection, the system could be used
in the following manner to insure that irradiated bundles
have not been diverted.
(a) The bundle counters would indicate the number of
irradiated bundles which have taken the normal route from
the reactor to the spent fuel bay since the last inspection.
The inspector would count the number of bundles in the bay
which have not been sealed into cages, and confirm that it
checks with the bundle counter tallies.
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(b) The gamma verifier would be used to verify that
the bundles in (a) are not dummies. All trays might be
checked individually, or a sampling technique used, de-
pending on the degree of confidence considered necessary.
For example, if routine inspections took place every two
months, approximately 720 bundles would normally have been
discharged from the reactor and loaded onto 30 trays between
inspections. Assuming a proliferation scenario which involves
diversion of a significant amount of plutonium during the
inspection "dead-time," at least 112 bundles would have
been taken from the pool and replaced by dummies. Thus,
in the worst case, only five out of thirty trays would
contain dummies, and it would be prudent to check each
individual tray since a random sampling of a considerable
fraction of the total would be needed to insure that the
bundle substitution scheme was detected with a high level
of confidence. For example, if only ten trays are checked,
the confidence level is less than 85%.
(c) The inspector would supervise the sealing of the
fuel verified in (b) into cages, and the sealing of these
cages. The seals on previously secured cages would be checked
on a random basis.
(d) Film and videotapes from the surveillance cameras
would be reviewed either on-site or at IAEA Headquarters.
(e) The seals on safeguard equipment would be verified
and the equipment serviced as required to insure tamper-
proof, reliable operation.
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Equipment redundancy is provided in the following
manner:
(a) A diversion of irradiated bundles via a route which
bypasses the bundle counters and then leads off-site through
an opening in the containment shell would be detected by
the cameras which observe the fuelling machines, the cameras
and radiation monitors which watch for the presence of
irradiated material along the fresh fuel path, and finally
the camera which monitors the openings in the containment.
(b) A diversion of irradiated bundles from the spent
fuel bay after they have been counted would show up as a
discrepancy between the bundle counter tally and the number
in storage, and would also be observed by the cameras which
monitor the bay. These cameras, as well as the bundle
verifier, would also detect an attempted substitution of
dummy bundles.
Since a working demonstration of the entire system at
an operating reactor has not yet taken place--one is planned
at Gentilly 2 in early 1980 when the reactor is scheduled to
start-up--a judgement as to its efficacy would be premature.
We confine ourselves to the following preliminary observations:
(a) It is apparent that much thought has gone into the
system design, and considerable effort into developing the
required equipment; e.g., tamper-indicating, highly reliable
bundle counters. Moreover, there is an awareness that further
improvements which would reduce the residual vulnerabilities
of the present scheme could be implemented. For example,
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fresh fuel bundle counters would provide additional confi-
dence that a diversion of undeclared fresh fuel after
irradiation would be detected, even in the event of a "common-
mode" failure in which all surveillance cameras stopped work-
ing and the irradiated fuel bundle counters were bypassed.
The question of the degree of safeguard protection is obvious-
ly a matter of costsvs. benefits which may be most keenly
felt in the case of retrofitting existing reactors.1
(b) The question of whether this safeguards scheme
provides timely warning of the diversion of irradiated
bundles depends on one's perception of the time required
to extract a significant amount of plutonium from spent
fuel. The IAEA had estimated this time to be between one
12and three months.12 Accordingly, a routine inspection
every two montns and an annual physical inventory have been
8
suggested as a reasonable procedure. In the light of
some estimates that 10 kg of plutonium might be extracted
13from spent fuel in a matter of weeks, a more intensive
routine may be prudent. However, as in (1), this is a
matter of addedcosts vs. expected benefits, where resolution
requires the accumulation of some operating experience.
In this regard, some non-proliferation analysts have suggested
that timely detection of the diversion of spent fuel can
only be assured via an instrumented near-real-time surveil-
lance system involving monitors at the reactor site which
can be remotely interrogated via a secure communication
link from IAEA Headquarters. Other observers feel that
this is an example of proliferation-resistance engineering
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"overkill" which may be appropriate for weapon-grade material,
14
but not spent fuel. Here, without entering this debate,
we would only point out that a remote monitoring system which
only cnecks te seals on secured assemblies of light water
reactor fuel between periodic refuellings is not sufficient
in the case of on-load fuelling where irradiated bundles
are constantly accumulating.in the fuel bay.
(3) The thesis that dependence on external supplies of
enriched uranium fuel for its light water reactors would
be a constraining influence for a nation contemplating a
move towards nuclear weapons while the use of the CANDU
national uranium fuel cycle removes this inhibition presup-
poses that:15
(a) the supply of natural uranium and heavy water for
normal makeup either in the world market or from indigenous
sources is relatively secure.
(b) the enrichment control leverage will be applied
uniformly by all suppliers, including perhaps an international
fuel bank, and uranium enrichment technology will not spread.
The indigenous resources of uranium ore of various
non-nuclear weapons states who have expressed interest
in or already made a commitment to the natural uranium
fuel cycle are given in Table 2.16 Although only
Argentina has large, reasonably assured resources, the
general availability of sufficient indigenous resources
to operate a modest nuclear program based on the CANDU
fuel cycle (100 mg.U/GWe-yr. at 75% capacity) should
be noted.
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Table 2
Uranium Resources Recoverable at Costs up to $130/kg U (megagrams U)
Reasonably Estimated
Country Assured Resources Additional Resources
Argentina 41,800 ---
South Korea 3,000 ---
Rumania Not available
Mexico 4,700 2,400
Yugoslavia 6,500 20,500
Philippines --- 400
Turkey 4,100 ---
Pakistan Small deposits exist, but magnitude unknown
Taiwan No deposits of commercial value found
The nuclear export policies of three of the five major
suppliers of ore outside the Communist Bloc: the United
States, Canada, and Australia are quite stringent with
regard to satisfaction of non-proliferation and safe-
guards criteria. Thus, for countries which need to import
ore, the mere existence of these resources would provide
little cause for comfort to potential nth countries or even
nations whose non-proliferation bona fides are rarely
questioned. Indeed, Canadian insistence on the right of
prior consent to reprocessing of Canadian origin material,
control over all material of Canadian origin even if
others attached their own safeguards requirements to the
same material, and control on retransfers of nuclear
technology, led to an embargo on uranium shipments to the
European Economic Community (ECC) Japan, and Switzerland
17in January 1977. The case of South Africa and Niger,
the other major non-Communist Bloc uranium suppliers.
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is more complex. Because of its non-adherence to the NPT,
its pariah status in the international community, and its
indigenous nuclear expertise--symbolized by the non-safe-
guarded uranium enrichment facility at Valindaba --South
Africa has been a prime focus of non proliferation concern.
Its official policy on uranium exports has been described
18as follows:
The export of uranium is governed by the
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, No. 90
of 1967. In terms of that Act, uranium may
be exported only on the authority of the
Minister of Mines, acting after consultation
with the Atomic Energy Board. When considering
applications for permission to export,
account is taken of the status of the end-
user, the country of destination, applicable
safeguards, price and other proposed conditions
of sale.
Obviously, it would be naive to expect that South
Africa will attach the same non-proliferation criteria to
its uranium exports as do the United States, Canada, and
Australia, all of whom require; e.g., safeguards on all
peaceful nuclear activities as a condition for nuclear
commerce of any kind. However, whether it would agree to
either continue to export to a country which had clearly
violated its non-proliferation undertakings or step in as
a supplier of last resort in the same situation is
problematic. Given its diplomatic situation, South
Africa would probably find it prudent to maintain a low
profile in nuclear matters unless its own vital interests
were clearly at stake.
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The other important African supplier is Niger, with
reasonably assured resources of 160,000 megagrams U recover-
16able at costs up to $130/kg U.16 A wide range of companies
from foreign countries--most notably France, but also
including Japan, West Germany, Canada, Italy, theFRG, and
the UK--are carrying out uranium prospecting in the country
in accordance with the wish of the Niger Government to have a
diversity of partners in developing the mining industry. 19
In sum, supplies of natural uranium ore in quantities
large enough to support a modest nuclear program based on the
CANDU fuel cycle may be generally available either from indi-
genous resources of from suppliers who might not insist on
satisfaction of the same non-proliferation criteria as do the
U.S., Canada, and Australia.
As regards the availability of heavy water, the feedstocks
for the production processes which have been implemented commer-
cially, ordinary water, electrolytic hydrogen and ammonia
synthesis gas, are more readily available than natural uranium.
However, in the event of a total ebargo on heavy water which
took effect after the amount necessary for reactor inventory
had been supplied (approximately 0.8 MT/MWe, or about 500 MT for
the standard 600 MWe CANDU export model), a nation would either
need to have heavy water in reserve or the technology required
to produce it in amounts required for either normal makeup or
20
accidental loss.20 Presently, the countries which can supply
large amounts of heavy water; i.e., on the order of a hundred
tons per year, are the U.S. and perhaps the U.S.S.R., Canada,
while the U.S., Canada, France, Switzerland, and the FRG have
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demonstrated a capacity to build large-scale production facili-
ties. All of the above are members of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group whose safeguards trigger list includes both heavy water
product and production technology. Moreover, current U.S. and
Canadian policy goes significantly beyond the guidelines with
regard to heavy water, requiring, at the minimum, either adher-
ence to the NPT or acceptance of the principle of full-scope
safe-guards for the transfer of heavy water technology. Whether
the heavy water genie can be kept in the bottle in the face of:
(1) the reluctance of France, Switzerland and the FRG to go
beyond the Nuclear Suppliers guidelines as far as the transfer
of this technology is concerned, and (2) the ability of countries
to master it on their own, is problematical. (These questions
are discussed in more detail in Chapter III.)
(2) In the 1980's the major suppliers of separative work will be
the US, the USSR, and the Eurodif and Urenco consortia. The US
and the USSR, the Urenco partners: the UK, the FRG, and the
Netherlands, and France, the major actor in Eurodif, are all
adherents to the Nuclear Suppliers guidelines which call for
"restraint" in the transfer of uranium enrichment technology,
and also raise the specter of supplier sanctions in the event of
a violation of supplier/recipient understandings. Regarding
the latter, the guidelines do not require the application of
21sanctions.21 This would not be in the spirit of the document
which is essentially a non-binding gentleman's agreement rather
than a treaty; indeed the word "sanctions" is not mentioned.
However, there is an attempt to address the potential problem
of non-uniform perceptions of the seriousness of violations of
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non-proliferation undertakings. That is, it is agreed that:22
Pending the early outcome of such con-
sultations [between suppliers on possible
violations of supplier/recipient under-
standings resulting from these guidelines],
suppliers will not act in a manner that
could prejudice any measure that may be
adopted by other suppliers concerning
their current contacts with that recip-
ient.
A crucial test of this policy is likely if the U.S. does
not continue supplying India with enriched uranium for the
light water reactors at Tarapur. In this case, it is con-
ceivable that Eurodif or the USSR might become the supplier
of "last resort". There seems to be little disposition on the
part of the US government, particularly in the Congress or the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, to exempt India from adherence
to full-scope safeguards, mandated by the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Act of 1978, as a (retroactive) condition for the con-
tinuation of nuclear commerce with the US, while on the Indian
side there is great reluctance to accede to US pressure.
The dangers inherent in this situation are obvious, since the
temptation to allow commercial and/or geo-political considerations
relating to nuclear supply to dominate nonproliferation concerns
is ever present. The same generic problem is also at the
heart of the issue of the spread of enrichment technologies.
That is, the conventional wisdom embodied in such maxims as:
"technological barriers inevitably erode in time" and "the
secrets of nature are an open book" overlook the historical
fact that the spread of nuclear technology in general, and
expertise relating to heavy water production, reprocessing,
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and to a lesser extent, uranium enrichment in particular,
have largely been the result of conscious decisions by various
actors that the political/commercial benefits of transfer
outweighed the proliferation risks, where this factor has
23been considered at all. If a serious commitment is made
towards restraining the future transfer of enrichment tech-
nology, while making credible assurances of supplies of low-
enriched uranium--how the US "plays the Tarapur card" may be
crucial in this respect--there are grounds for optimism that
24this technology will not spread rapidly. In sum-
mary, the question of whether the cause of non proliferation
would be better served from the viewpoint of relative leverage
on the supply of strategic nuclear materials --by the adop-
tion of the light or heavy water reactor fuel cycles has no
clear-cut answer. Moreover, specifically nuclear-related
sanctions may not always be the most appropriate response
to violations. The overriding issue is the degree of
consensus among suppliers and recipients on the importance
of adherence to mutually agreed-upon non proliferation
norms.
(4) Wnether a nation which decides to obtain nuclear weapons
via a path involving irradiation of natural uranium to pro-
duce plutonium in a so-called "production"reator will
choose to use grapnite or heavy-water as a moderator depends
on various factors; e.g., relative availability of these
25
materials, technical capability, and the proliferation
scenario. As far as the historical record is concerned,
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a case can be made for either material. That is, the US,
USSR, UK and France all initially used graphite-moderated
reactors to produce weapons material, while India and
perhaps others have taken the heavy water route. For the
former group of nations, the greater availability of gra-
phite at the time the initial weapons decision was made, the
relative simplicity of the graphite reactor design, and the
fact that there was no perceived need to fuzz the weapons-
nature of the device by calling it a research reactor,
outweighed the superior moderating properties of heavy
water, which lead to higher neutron fluxes and hence greater
neutron production per megawatt of reactor power in a physi-
cally more compact device. The implication one may draw
from this as far as the possible future course of prolifer-
ation via the production reactor route can be summarized as
follows. Nations without a high degree of nuclear expertise
who wish a relatively cheap and simple route to weapons,
and are not overly concerned by the signal that detection
of a clandestine graphite-moderated reactor would send to the
international communitymight find this an attractive method.
On the other hand, nations who nurture more sophisticated
weapons objectives and/or those who wish to develop a civilian
nuclear program in a manner which fosters ambiguity as to
weapons intentions would find the heavy water route more to
i/ ~ their taste. Witn regard to the latter, a series of articles
published in 1970 by the Indian strategic analyst K. Subrah-
manyam reparticularly interesting, and we quote from them
-, ~manyam are particularly interesting, and we quote from them
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in some detail.
The other countries of the world took their
decisions to become nuclear weapon powers (China
the last one in 1957) when civil nuclear techno-
logy had not developed. Consequently, in all
these countries, military technology preceded
civil nuclear technology. In India it is possible
to reverse this process and move from a develope
civil nuclear technology to weapons technology.v
The proposals made by Dr. Sarabhai (then chair-
man of the Indian Department of Atomic Energy)
on May 25 constitute a well-thought out and
balanced programme for the development of nuclear
option to the point when the Government will be
in a position to decide to become an operational
nuclear power. However, it may be emphasized
that the programme as formulated now is still
a programme of development of infrastructure
only, and not a weapons development programme.
It stops just short of that. This, however,
need not discourage those who would like to see
India become a nuclear weapon power. If we
proceed on tne lines proposed by Dr. Sarabhai,
the point of decision will come three to four
years from now. It is, therefore, not necessary
for te government, at this stage to announce
a decision. It can continue to proclaim honestly
for the next three years that it has taken no
decision to become a nuclear weapon power.27
Rana Pratap Sagar and Kalpakkam (sites of the
first two heavy water power projects in India, the
former built with Canadian assistance)can be made
to produce weapon grade plutonium but at uneconom-
ic costs. Therefore if India decides to produce
plutonium for weapons purposes it is necessary to
set up new reactors the sole purpose of which will
be to produce plutonium for weapons and not attempt
to get it from power reactors. It will take at
least three years from the date of decision to
set up such reactors. Further such reactors will
need neavy water and this heavy water will have to
be produced in addition to our requirements for
Rana Pratap Sagar and Kalpakkam. Therefore our heavy
water capacity will also have to be augmented.
This again will take time of the order of three to
four years from the date of decision.28
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The costs of a complex designed for integrated
production of some eight kilogrammes (95%)
plutonium-239 per year and concentrated around
a 40-50 MWth heavy water cooled and moderated
reactor with a throughput of 20 tons metallic
natural fuel per year can be estimated as
follows...The reactor capital and operating costs
are based on information concerning the Canadian
reactor NRX.
Although this "latent proliferation" philosophy was adopted
by the Indian Government, it is interesting that Subramanyam's
realpolitik advice regarding the inadvisability of using
plutonium from spent fuel irradiated in either the Rana
Pratap Sagar power reactor or the CIRUS research reactor in a
crash weapons programme was not followed.
Such a crash programme...will involve India
breaking her treaty obligations to Canada. It
has been argued that in the supreme national
interest such an action would be justifiable.
It is not so much the ethics of the action as the
advisability of it that is to be considered.
If we contravene our treaty obligations to Canada,
there will be immense pressure on France to
repudiate the technical collaboration agreement
with India on space and on the fast breeder
reactor. France even though not a
signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, has
declared that she will behave as though she is
a signatory in her relationship with other nations...
As pointed out earlier, the fast breeder reactor
programme is the core of future nuclear energy
development in India. In addition, our repudia-
tion of treaty obligations with Canada is also
likely to endanger the continued supply of
enriched uranium for the Tarapar plant for which
we depend on the United States. For these reasons,
it is obvious that breaking of our treaty obli-
gations with Canada will not be a prudent step
and will not be advantageous to India.2 7
In retrospect, Subramanyam was unnecessarily concerned about
France's reaction, remarkably prescient regarding the U.S.,
but completely overlooked the impact on India's nuclear
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program stemming from the adverse reaction of the country
directly involved, Canada. In this connection, a recent
critique of India's nuclear policy by G.S. Bhargava
seems closerto the mark,
Considering he crucial importance of the
Rajasthan reactors to the whole scheme of
things, and in view of the need for continued
collaboration with Canada, nothing worse could
have been done than to have provoked the dis-
ruption of the arrangement with Canada...Against
this background, embarking on a peaceful under-
ground explosion which was not either directly
or indirectly relevant to the power generation
programme, and the objective of speedy self-
sufficiency in nuclear technology and equipment, 30
could only be described as an essay in adventurism.
2.2 Other Heavy Water Reactors
Besides the natural uranium CANDU, there are four other
heavy water moderated reactors of current interest. These
are:
(1) The natural uranium, on-power-fuelled, heavy-water
cooled, pressure vessel reactor.
(2) The mixed-oxide, light-water cooled, pressure
tube reactor.
(3) The slightly-enriched CANDU
(4) The CANDU On the Thorium cycle.
Of the above,representatives of the first two are currently
on-line in Argentina (ATUCHA I) and Japan (FUGEN), respective-
ly. The latter two are, for the moment at least, "paper"
reactors; (3) is characterized by uranium ore reguire-
ments approximately 20% smaller than the standard CANDU and
about 40% smaller than the light water reactor on a once-
through cycle,31 while the latter, operating in a recycle
-78-
mode, is seen by some as an economic alternative to the
32gast breeder reactor.32 Although the slightly enriched and
thorium cycle CANDUs are interesting concepts, there are
technical, economic, and political impediments to the
commercialization of either, and for this reason we confine
our discussion of these reactors to the following brief
comments regarding their proliferation resistance as com-
pared to the standard CANDU:
(3) The use of slightly-enriched fuel (typically 1.2% U-235)
would make this reactor dependent on supplies of both enrich-
ment and heavy water and reduce the amount of plutonium in
31the spent fuel to the level of current LWRs.31 This combi-
nation of features, taken together with its superior uranium
resource utilization and the possibility of off-load fuelling,
makes it a favorite among those who see a role for nuclear
power, but wish to defer the plutonium economy as long as
possible. Its penetration in developing countries on these
grounds is dubious.
(4) The version of the throium cycle which has received
most attention is the so-called "denatured-urnaium thorium
cycle." The non-proliferation issues raised by this cycle
are largely independent of whether the reactor utilizes
light water, heavy water, or graphite moderation, and are
concerned with the resistance of the isotopic barrier to
misuse at the front-end of the cycle, the decreased plutonium
at the back-end, and how it would be deployed. We refer
the reader to reference33 for a discussion of this concept
by one of its chief proponents.
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2.2.1 Heavy-Water-Cooled, Pressure Vessel Reactors
Reactor Physics and Engineering34
Both pressure tube and pressure vessel designs utilize
tubes in which the fuel resides and through which the coolant
flows. The essential difference is that in pressure vessel
reactors these tubes do not have to withstand a pressure
differential. Accordingly, they may be made from thinner
material, thus minimizing the amount of structural material,
and hence neutron absorption in the core. As a compensating
feature, the entire moderator at full primary system and
at an elevated temperature must be contained by the pressure
vessel the latter must be much larger and thicker than an
LWR pressure vessel for the same rated output because of the
inferior slowing-down power of heavy water. Although the
individual coolant feeder pipes characteristic of the pres-
sure tube design are not necessary in pressure vessel reac-
tors, the use of natural uranium fuel necessitates on-power
fuelling in both, which means that external operable pressure
connections to each coolant channel are a common feature.
Capsule History of ATUCHA I
The prototype of the 319 MWe ATUCHA I reactor built
in Argentina by Siemens AG (first commercial operation
June 1974) was the 50 MWe MZR reactor, (operational 1965),
also built by Siemens at Karlsruhe in the F.R.G. In the
consideration of the bids received for the ATUCHA station
by the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) in 1967,
there was a strong inclination on technological grounds in
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favor of the CANDU; this because in addition to using natural
uranium, it also had the added advantage that its design
and engineering made it particularly suitable for important
participation by the Argentine semi-heavy electromechanical
industry. In particular, while the manufacture of a large
pressure vessel was beyond the competence of the latter, there
was confidence that it could master the technology involved
in making pressure tubes and the calandria. Nevertheless,
the Germans -- with their greater negitiating flexibility as
35
compared to the Canadians -- carried the day. As one
participant in the negotiations has remarked: "Ideally, we
would have liked a CANDU sold by Siemens. All the same,
we paid for a Chevrolet and got a Cadillac." 36 For a
comprehensive discussion of ATUCHA I, see reference 37.
Nonproliferation Considerations
As compared to the CANDU, where the fuel is contained
in short bundles (0.5m), fuel in ATUCHA I is contained in
long assemblies (5.3m). The fuelling pattern requires
replacement of one assembly per day or 30 per month in
contrast to the 300 bundles per month estimated for a
600MWe CANDU. The smaller number of larger fuel elements
should make covert diversion of spent fuel more difficult.
In this regard, we note that each fresh fuel assembly contains
approximately 150 kg of uranium. At a discharge burnup of
6000 MWD/T,38 CANDU fuel would contain about 0.32% Pu.39
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Neglecting the small differences in reactor physics between
ATUCHA and CANDU,40 this gives approximately 0.5 kg Pu per
assembly with a Pu-239 isotope content of about 70%. Thus,
16 assemblies would contain about 8 kg of Pu. Aside from
this difference in fuelling, the broader nonproliferation
implications of CANDU and ATUCHA are similar. In partic-
ular, both utilize natural uranium at the "price" of a heavy
water requirement of about 0.8 MT D20/MWe for initial inven-
tory,or 265 MT for ATUCHA I.
2.2.2 Mixed Oxide (MOX),Boiling-Light-Water-Cooled(BLW) Pressure
Tube Reactors
Reactor Physics and Engineering
As compared with reactors such as CANDU and ATUCHA I,
those which use heavy water for moderator only have the
obvious advantage of saving the cost of the heavy water
coolant, which amounts to approximately 0.3 MT/MWe. Moreover,
in those BLW designs such as FUGEN and the British Steam
Generating Heavy Water Reactor (SGHWR) which use enriched
fuel, the heavy water moderator requirement is also reduced
by about 0.1-0.2 MT/MWe. In particular, the total heavy water
inventory in a MOX, BLW heavy water reactor is roughly half-
0.4 MT vs. 0.8 MT per MWe - of that required for CANDU or
ATUCHA. At a cost of $250,000/MT D20 this represents a
considerable saving, e.g., $60 million for a 600 MWE reactor.
The implications of the use of boiling light water instead
of pressurized heavy water as coolant on the reactor physics
and engineering can be briefly summarized as follows.
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If natural uranium is chosen as fuel, as in the Canadian
Gentilly-l reactor, the excess reactivity is so small that
on-power fueling is essential. Even with this feature, the
ratio of heavy to light water must be large in order to min-
imize the loss of neutrons via absorption in the latter, and
hence the light water contributes little to neutron modera-
tion. A loss of coolant, then, has a positive feedback
effect on the reactor power; i.e., less coolant implies less
neutron absorption, which leads to greater reactor power,
which causes a further decrease in coolant density, and so
on. Thus, such a reactor has a positive void coefficient of
reactivity. (Since heavy water also absorbs neutrons, this
effect is also present in a CANDU, but is much smaller because
of the much smaller neutron absorption cross-section of heavy
water, and hence is easily manageable.) There are basically
two ways to alleviate this positive feedback effect. Both
require the use of enriched fuel, which also affords the op-
tion of using off-power fueling. In the enriched uranium
SGHWR, the ratio of heavy to light water is much smaller; in
this situation the light water coolant contributes signif-
icantly to the moderation of neutrons; hence a loss of coolant
implies both a decreased neutron absorption in the water and
an increased resonance absorption of neutrons in the fuel,
because of the hardened neutron spectrum. These effects tend
to cancel; i.e., the increase in the thermal utilization is
counterbalanced by a decrease in the resonance escape prob-
ability, and the void coefficient of reactivity is practically
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zero. Another way to achieve this goal without paying the
price of substantial neutron absorption in the coolant is to
use plutonium MOX instead of enriched uranium as fuel. Since
the neutron absorption in plutonium is greater than in ura-
nium, the relative increase in thermal utilization due to
loss of coolant is smaller in the former case. Hence, the
heavy-to-light-water ratio can be higher than in the SGHWR.
In addition, the use of Pu MOX means that the operating char-
acteristics of the fuel remain essentially unchanged during
irradiation, which helps to simplify the reactor system con-
trol design, this in contrast to the use of slightly enriched
uranium fuel with a concomitant ingrowth of plutonium iso-
topes during irradiation. In the case of enriched designs,
on-power fueling is an option having the advantage of a pos-
sible gain in fuel burnup at the price of increased fueling
complexity and increased reactor "hardening" in areas of seis-
mic activity.
Capsule History of FUGEN
Although an English graphite-moderated, gas-cooled reac-
tor (GCR) was the first reactor to supply commercial power in
Japan (1966), LWRs imported from the U.S. (roughly equal num-
bers of PWRs and BWRs) quickly became the dominant reactor
type. Today, 18 LWRs generate approximately 14,000 MWe of
power. However, even before the operation of the first GCR,
the Japanese Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) decided, in 1966,
to establish a national policy for the development of advan-
ced thermal reactors (ATR) of the heavy-water-moderated,
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boiling light water-cooled type and fast breeder reactors
(FBR). The rationale for this policy was a feeling of uncer-
tainty about the future availability of enriched uranium fuel,
and a desire to establish an independent fuel cycle capabil-
ity. In particular, the ATR was seen as insurance in the
event that the commercialization of the FBR was delayed. To
implement advanced reactor development, the Power Reactor and
Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (PNC) was established in
1967.
A prototype ATR named FUGEN with a capacity of 165 MWe
was designed by PNC, and its construction began in 1970. The
original design called for the predominant use of 1.5% U-235
- fuel in the core,as plutonium was difficult to obtain commer-
cially. However, in the early 1970s, with the greater avail-
ability of plutonium, the design was changed to incorporate
96 (0.55-0.8% Pu) MOX fuel assemblies in the center of the
core, with 128 (1.5% U-235) UO2 assemblies around them.
Using this configuration FUGEN went critical in March, 1978.
However, the exclusive use of Pu MOX fuel is a basic philosophy
of the FUGEN-ATR development, and the reactor will switch to
this operating mode after the enriched uranium fuel in the
initial core has achieved its design burnup. The conceptual
design of a 600 MWE demonstration reactor based on FUGEN has
already been completed, but the decision to bejin construction
has not yet been made by the JAEC. For further technical
and historical details, see reference 41.
mm 
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Nonproliferation Considerations
From the nonproliferation perspective the most vexing
feature of the FUGEN system is that - unlike CANDU or ATUCHA
I - it has been designed to operate using plutonium fuel.
This opens the door to reprocessing and plutonium recycle in
advanced thermal reactors, and thus undercuts the proposition
that the plutonium economy can be postponed until it is clear
that the continued viability of nuclear power dictates the
42
need for fast breeder reactors. In this regard, it is
interesting that a combined LWR-FUGEN system - with make-up
plutonium for the latter derived from the spent fuel of the
former - has a net uranium resource requirement essentially
equivalent to a slightly enriched CANDU on a once-through
cycle, and decidedly inferior to a CANDU operating on self-
43generated plutonium recycle. This indicates that (1) ura-
nium resource savings on the order of those achieved by FUGEN
may also be achieved on once-through cycles, and that (2)
there are more efficient thermal converters for operation
on the recycle mode. Unfortunately, from the Japanese (and
U.S.) perspective, both CANDU cycles have a fatal flaw: they
suffer from "the NIH (not invented here) disease" which, giv-
en current political and economic realities, is probably
incurable. Outside Japan, successful implementation of
FUGEN may have its greatest influence on the nuclear estab-
lishments of its neighbors, Taiwan and South Korea, both of
whom have a long-standing interest in heavy water-moderated,
advanced converter reactors.
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3. The Heavy Water Genie
Since its discovery in 1932, and particularly in the 1950s
and 1960s when interest in heavy water moderated reactors
for civilian and military applications was at its zenith, many
potential processes for large scale production of heavy water
1have been investigated (For an extensive bibliography, see
reference 2). Of these, very few have been pursued beyond
tne laboratory stage, and still fewer have been used for pro-
duction on the order of tons of product per year. As of 1975,
cumulative world production of heavy water - excluding China and
the U.S.S.R.3 - was between eight and nine thousand metric
tons, with just over 90 per cent having been made by the GS process.
Tne remainder has been produced by hydrogen - water vapor exchange
plus electrolysis (6%), hydrogen distillation (2%), ammonia -
hydrogen exchange (1%) and water distillation (0.3%)4 (Table 1).
As these figures indicate, te GS process holds tne dominant
position. It is the only proven process for large-scale pro-
duction, and in this respect its position is similar to that
of the gaseous diffusion process for uranium enrichment. Besides
the GS process, there are five other techniques whichmerit at-
tention. Of these, hydrogen-ammonia exchange and hydrogen distil-
lation have been implemented commercially. For the other three.
hydrogen-water exchange, hydrogen-amine exchange, and laser
isotope separation, both theoretical and laboratory studies -
and for the amine system, pilot plant experience - have demon-
strated their potential promise. In sections A and B we review
heavy water production fundamentals and process comparisons,
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respectively. Our intention here is not to write a primer on
heavy water production - several excellent reviews are already
available5'6 - but to provide enough background for an apprecia-
tion of the problems involved in attempting to implement this
technology on both a large and small scale, sections C and D.
In the latter, we remark briefly on some considerations in-
volved in safeguarding large heavy water plants. Finally in
Section E, we discuss some of the proprietary and political
considerations which bear on the question of the spread of
heavy water technology.
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3.1 Heavy Water Fundamentals
The basic tecnnical facts regarding heavy water production
are as follows:
(1) Deuterium source materials which are in sufficient
supply to be used as feed for large-scale heavy water production
are: water, petroleum, methane, hydrogen and ammonia. Since
water is by far the most abundant of these materials, heavy water
production processes whicn utilize it as the feed material,
the GS process in particular; have essentially unlimited plant
capacity, whereas tne capacity of those processes which utilize
one of the other feedstocks such as ammonia synthesis gas are
limited by te availability of the latter, and must be sited
in proximity to its source; e.g., tne ammonia synthesis plant.
(2) The natural deuterium abundance in potential feedstocks
is very small, varying from roughly 90 to 160 ppm atom %.4
Since the cost of heavy water roduction is
approximately inversely proportional to the deuterium content
of the feed - basically because te more dilute the feed, the
greater the amount of material that has to be processed to
extract a given amount of deuterium - there is a strong economic
incentive in using feed of the highest possible concentration.
At the same time, te feed should not corrode standard construction
materials - unfortunately this makes the use of sea water a
questionable proposition - and should also be reasonably free
of impurities, since even tracesof the latter can cause severe
operating problems. For example,
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(a) Various impurities in the feed water to the GS process
can cause foaming of the gas-liquid mixture on the contacting
traysleading to large decreases in the production rate.
(b) Solidification of te nitrogen impurity in the synthesis
gas feed to a hydrogen distillation plant causes eventual blockage
in key process components.
(c) Oxygen impurity in the synthesis gas feed to a hydrogen-
ammonia exchange plant can react explosively with the potassium
amide catalyst used in this process.
Tne stringency of the purification task stems from the
large amount of feed material which must be processed per
unit of product. For example, at a 800 ton per year GS plant,
approximately one ton of freshwater is processed per second.
If the efficiency of feedwater treatment is such as to reduce
the impurity level in the feed to one ppm, about one ton of
impurity would still build up in the system every two weeks.
(3) The low deuterium abundance in te feed, typically
150 ppm in fresh water, coupled with the high concentration
of deuteriun required for reactor-grade product implies that
the equipment must effect an increase in abundance ratio of
6
about 3.3 x 10 . The incremental enrichment provided by an
individual separating element in all known heavy water pro-
duction processes is not sufficient to span this concentration
range. Thus, many elements must be connected in series to
multiply the elementary effect. For example, in the GS pro-
cess, the individual separating elements are sieve trays on
which te upflowing hydrogen sulfide gas and downflowing
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water are successively mixed. While it is possible in principle
to obtain the required overall enrichment in a single tower or
stage, in practice it is advantageous instead to use several
towers of progressively smaller size in series; i.e., an
enrichment cascade. This procedure takes advantage of the
smaller flows of enriched material in the higher stages, and
reduces the total tower volume and heavy water inventory.
(4) In all processes, the lower stages dominate the plant
capital and energy costs. An equivalent statement is that
most of the separative work is required at the bottom of the
cascade. In heavy water production, it is common practice
to use one process for extraction of deuterium from feed to
an abundance on te order of 1-10% and another process such as
water distillation, which would be too costly in terms of
separative work per unit product for extraction, for concentration
to reactor grade product. Besides its inherent simplicity, the
basic advantage of water distillation is that it can be operated
at sub-atmospheric pressure, thus minimizing the potential for
leakage of the enriched water.
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3.2 Process Comparisons
The two most useful indices of the economic attractiveness
of an isotope separation process are the increment of enrich-
7
ment possible in a single separating element, , and the energy
consumption per unit of the product. The importance of the
former stems from the fact that the size and hence the initial
cost of the plant as well as the thermodynamic minimum energy
consumption forirreversible processes such as gaseous diffusion
-2
and electrolysis are proportional to EC , (a-l). For
reversible processes such as distillation, chemical exchange,
and centrifugation, the thermodynamic minimum energy consumption
is proportional to the entropy of mixing which is independent
of . In practice, the energy consumption of reversible pro-
cesses is much greater than the mixing entropy, and depends
on . In particular, for chemical exchange and distillation,
most of the energy is consumed in providing the reflow of
the working substance (technically, the reflux) at the ends
of the tower rather tnan in the contacting equipment where
tne isotope separation takes place. These refluxing costs
-1
are proportional to . Generally, for reversible processes,
tne actual energy consumption depends on the details of the
plant design and represents a tradeoff between the added
capital cost of equipment-such as additional heat exchangers
in dual-temperature chemical exchange processes and sophisticated
rotor bearings in centrifugation-which can reduce the energy
consumption. A comparison of five separation processes with
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respect to separation factor and energy consumption is given
in Table 2. It is clear that the mass dependence of favors
electrolysis, distillation and chemical exchange for heavy
water production, provided the working substance in distillation
is hydrogen. The latter two are equilibrium processes and
their utility for isotope separation; i.e., the fact thato
differs from unity, is a purely quantum phenomenon stemming
from the differences in the vibrational energy levels of the
8isotopic molecules. The energy requirements for heavy water
production of both chemical exchange and hydrogen distil-
lation are moderate. The same cannot be said of either
electrolysis or gaseous diffusion. Indeed, if heavy water
nad to be made y these processes, the cost of the heavy water
inventory for a CANDU reactor would make the system uncom-
petitive with LWRs. As is well known, the situation is re-
versed for heavy elements such as uranium. Here, the mass
dependence of. favors gaseous diffusion and the centrifuge,
witn the latter also enjoying a considerable advantage compared
to the former with respect to energy consumption.
In sum, the chemical excnange processes and hydrogen
distillation are the only realistic non-laser possibilities
for economic production of heavy water. Of these, the standard
of comparison is, of course, the GS process. In the following
we briefly discuss these processes as well as the prospects
for laser isotope separation of deuterium.
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3.2.1 Chemical Exchange Processes
* The reactions of interest are those between hydrogen sulfide
gas and water (GS process), and between hydrogen gas and water,
ammonia, and methylamine. At low deuterium concentrations
the heavy isotope is present primarily in the monodeuterated
form, and hence these reactions can be represented respectively
as,
HDS + H20 H2S + HDO (1)
HD + H20 H2 + HDO (2)2 2
HD + NH3 H + NH2D (3)3r" 2 2
HD + CH3NH2 - H + CH3NHD (4)
The separation factor for these processes is directly pro-
portional to tne reaction equilibrium constant, K. For
example, for the GS process it is easily seen that
& - (D/H)H2O = [HDO]/[H20
(D/H)H2 S [HD8J /[H 2
9
is just equal to K.
As previously noted, the fact that K and hence< for
this reaction differs from unity, or more generally, that
the equilibrium constant of chemical exchange reactions dif-
fers from the value corresponding to classical equipartition
of the isotopes between the two chemical species, is a strictly
quantum-mechanical effect. It arises because of differences
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in tne internal vibrational frequencies of the isotopic
molecules. The deviation from classical behavior and hence
the separation effect is greatest at low temperatures and
for exchanging molecules in which the chemical binding of the
proton and deuteron differs most widely. In this regard,
the hydrogen-based systems, (2)-(4), particularly the non-
aqueous ones, have a marked advantage compared with the GS
process where the similarity between the hydrogen bonds with
oxygen and with sulfur limits the separation factor. The
"other side of the coin" is that this similarity facilitates
the reaction kinetics; by comparison the rate of exchange
in the hydrogen-based systems is very slow, especially at the
low cold tower temperatures at which they must be operated
in order to realize their potential advantage in separation
factor. While sufficient solubility of hydrogen sulfide in
water and rapid isotopic exchange can be achieved at moderate
pressures on simple sieve trays in the GS process, high pres-
sure, sophisticated contacting equipment, and catalysis are
required in hydrogen-based process to dissolve enough hydrogen
in the liquid solution and promote the exchange reaction.
* In principle, gas reflux for process ()-(4) can be produced
in either of two ways leading to two basic flowsheets: mono-
thermal or bithermal (dual-temperature). In the former, the
enriched liquid is chemically converted to the gas at the
bottom of the tower, Fig. la. In the latter, Fig. lb, the
depleted gas and enriched liquid from the exchange tower are
fed to another tower operating at a higher temperature. In
-104-
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this "hot" tower the reaction equilibrium constant is smaller
than in the "cold" tower, and the gas is reenriched at the
expense of the liquid. Formally, the hot tower replaces the
chemical conversion step as a source of enriched gas reflux.
However, there are important differencesbetween the two
methods. These stem from the fact that while the deuterium
abundance of the reflux in monothermal operation is equal to
that of the liquid input to the phase converter, the abundance
of the reflux provided by the hot tower in the bithermal
method is much lower. This implies a larger gas flow, more
contacting equipment, and a larger cold tower volume to
recover the same amount of deuterium from the feed stream
in a bithermal vs. a monothermal realization of the same
exchange process. Moreover, production of enriched product
between the two towers in bithermal operation demands precise
control of the gas-to-liquid flow ratio; this is not required
in monothermal operation. Unfortunately, chemical reflux is
only practical in the hydrogen-water and hydrogen-ammonia systems.
In the former, economic heavy water recovery is possible because
the cost of the chemical conversion step, water electrolysis,
is charged to hydrogen production for ammonia synthesis. In
the latter, the feed is ammonia synthesis gas, and the ammonia
which is cracked at the bottom of the exchange tower for gas
reflux must also be synthesized for liquid reflux at the top
of the tower. Although the added costs of monothermal opera-
tion - primarily associated with the energy needed for ammonia
cracking - lead to an energy requirement larger than that
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possible in the dual-temperature realization of this process,
a priori, this does not make a monothermal operation economically
uncompetitive. Indeed, up to this time, only the latter pro-
cess has had commercial operating experience. Unfortunately)
the same is not true of hydrogen sulphide - water exchange
10
where the cost of chemical conversion would be prohibitive,
and only bithermal operation, the GS process, is economic.
* Both the GS process and hydrogen-water exchange have the
advantage that their process heat requirements fall within
the capability of nuclear steam, by far the cheapest heat
source available today. The other exchange processes require
either heat at much higher temperature; e.g., for ammonia
cracking in monothermal hydrogen-ammonia exchange, or ex-
a- ~ pensive refrigeration; e.g., the cold tower in hydrogen-ammonia
and methylamine exchange as well as hydrogen distillation.
* While the GS process requires stringent quality control
because of the toxicity and corrosiveness of hydrogen sul-
fide, it does not require catalysis, and utilizes a water
feed allowing essentially unlimited production. Moreover,
many man-years have been spent in process optimization, par-
ticularly in Canada, and a new process would have to offer
substantial incentives in terms of cost or safety to offset
the accumulated experience with GS. Of the hydrogen-based
processes, hydrogen-water exchange combined with electrolysis
for hydrogen production would be especially attractive since
the process fluids are not toxic and only mildly corrosive,
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and the relative tower volume is only about one-third that
5
required in the GS process. Historically the basic technical
problem with this system has been the lack of a catalyst which
retains its activity in contact with liquid water. Develop-
ment efforts in this direction at AECL appear very promising.
However, at this time, there is no economic incentive to
produce large quantities of electrolytic hydrogen, and thus
this method - as well as hydrogen distillation - will find ap-
plication only in special situations. Of the two non-aqueous
hydrogen exchange parasitic processes, the greater solubility
and higher exchange rate in the amine system as compared
with ammonia permits operation at a lower temperature and
leads to a smaller plant volume in bithermal operation.
Unfortunately, a full scale plant based on the amine process
has not been built, although extensive pilot plant experience
has accumulated. Tne choice between a monothermal or a bi-
thermal flowsheet for the ydrogen-ammonia system revolves
mainly on the relative importance of a larger plant volume
for the latter but also a smaller energy consumption. A
considered judgement awaits the commissioning of the Indian
plants and the accumulation of significant operating experience.
3.2.2Hydrogen Distillation
Because of its high deuterium separation factor, distil-
lation of liquid hydrogen is a potentially attractive method
for producing heavy water. Several relatively small plants
(3-14 tons per year capacity) built and operated over the past
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20 years in Western Europe, India and the U.S.S.R. have
demonstrated the technological feasibility of this process;
e.g., the ability to handle large quantities of liquid hydro-
gen at cryogenic temperatures of 20° K. Its economic com-
petitiveness hinges on the nature and quantity of the avail-
able hydrogen feed material. In common with all hydrogen-
based deuterium separation methods, distillation must be
operated as a parasitic process; otherwise the cost of the
feed alone would be prohibitive. (For example, assuming a
90% recovery of hydrogen from feed and a hydrogen cost from
methane reforming of $0.03 per STP cubic meter, the feed cost
alone would be $250 per kg. D20.) There are basically two
sources for feed: ammonia synthesis gas and electrolytic
hydrogen. Thne former contains about 75% H2, 25% N2 , and
small amounts of CH4, A, CO2, 02 and H20, while the latter
contains only H20 and trace amounts of N2 and 02. As pre-
viously noted, the distillation process requires extremely
tnorough purification of the feed gas to eliminate condensed
impurities which would cause fouling of the equipment. This
makes the flowsheet of a plant using synthesis gas as feed
more complicated, and its energy consumption higher than one
using electrolytic hydrogen. Unfortunately, sources of electro-
lytic hydrogen are far less common than synthesis gas, and if
only the latter is available, the hydrogen-based chemical
excnange systems, especially amine, may be more attractive.
The prospects for heavy water production via hydrogen distil-
lation would be considerably brighter if the industrialized
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countries decided to produce large quantities of liquid
hydrogen as a synthetic fuel to replace hydrocarbons. In
this case, the cost of refrigeration could be charged to
the liquid hydrogen plant instead of the heavy water extraction.
However, at present the hydrogen economy seems a distant
prospect. Te key aspects of the chemical exchange processes
and hydrogen distillation are summarized in Table 3 .
3.2.3 Laser Isotope Separation (LIS)
The physical basis for potochemical separation of
isotopes is the fact that atomic and molecular vapors absorb
radiation only at well-defined (discrete) frequencies, specific
to every atomic or molecular species. Isotopic substitution
in an atom or molecule can change the absorption spectrum both
qualitatively and quantitatively, by changing the number and
position of the spectral lines. Tnese (usually) small dif-
ferences in the spectra of different isotopes can be exploited
by tuning a narrow-band laser to excite only one species in
an isotopic mixture, thus bringing about large changes in
the internal state of the isotope; e.g., stripping it of an
electron, changes which are then used to effect macroscopic
separations. The possibility of photochemical isotope separa-
tion is not new; it was recognized in 1920,12 but before
the discovery of the laser, it could not be exploited commer-
cially because the required isotopic selectivity and spatial
coherence of the light source could only be obtained by
- 110 -
Table 3. SELECTED HEAVY WATER SEPARATION PROCESSES
Advantages Disadvantages
Hydrogen
Distillation
Moderate separation
factor (1.5); small
tower volume; moderate
energy consumption;
extensive small plant
experience
Parasitic process (lim-
ited capacity); only
competitive with GS if
cold, pure hydrogen
source available;
operation at 20°K
Water feed (unlimited
capacity); moderate
separation factor (1.3),
tower volume and energy
consumption; well devel-
oped technology
Process fluids toxic
and corrosive; sensi-
tive process control
H20-H2 Exchange
(monothermal)
NH3-H2 Exchange
(monothermal)
NH3-H2 Exchange
(bithermal)
Amine-H2 Exchange
(bithermal)
Process fluids not toxic
and only mildly corrosive;
high separation factor
("3.9); small tower vol-
ume; low energy consump-
tion
High separation factor
(X5.5), moderate tower
volume and energy con-
sumption; simple to
control; demonstrated
technology
Moderate separation fac-
tor (1.7); low energy
consumption; as compared
with monothermal mode,
chemical conversions
and catalyst stipping
not required
Moderate separation fac-
tor (2.2); small tower
volume; low energy con-
sumpti on
Hydrophobic platinum
catalyst still under
development; parasitic
process (limited capac-
ity)
Requires catalysis,
operation at high pres-
sures, stringent gas
purification, sophisti-
cated contacting equip-
ment, NH cracking and
synthesi§; parasitic
process (limited capac-
ity)
Large tower volume;
requires catalysis,
operation at high pres-
sures, stringent gas
purification, sophisti-
cated contacting equip-
ment; parasitic process
(limited capacity)
Requires catalysis;
sophisticated contacting
equipment; catalyst un-
stable above 70°C; para-
sitic process (limited
capacity)
Method
GS
A*
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spectral and spatial filtering of a conventional light source
to the extent that most of its output energy is wasted. By
contrast, the large light intensities within a narrow spectral
bandwidth characteristic of lasers allows processing of a
significant amount of isotopic material, while the high degree
of spatial coherence allows efficient use of large f-number
optical systems to keep the unilluminated volume to a minimum.
The potential of LIS for uranium enrichment was recognized
quite soon after the discovery of the laser by a number of
investigators in different countries. However, because of
the sensitive nature of this application, the historical de-
velopment of LIS of uranium has been made quite unintelligible
by secrecy; this is still largely true. By contrast,
much of the research on LIS of isotopes other than
uranium has been reported in the open literature. In par-
ticular, over the past few years work as been in progress
in the U.S., Canada and several other countries on the ap-
plication of LIS to heavy water production. In terms of
research expenditures, articles in scientific journals and
tne popular press, and concern in the nonproliferation com-
munity, LIS of deuterium is a poor relation of uranium, except
perhaps in Canada. This is, to a certain extent, justified
by the economic facts of life. In the first place, the current
demand for enriched uranium is much greater than that for
heavy water. Moreover, using current technologies, enriching
uranium is much more expensive than heavy water production,13
and hence considerable ingenuity is required to invent a
laser separation technique for the latter which has a chance
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of displacing the GS process. However, if this could be done;
e.g., if LIS could produce heavy water at 1/5 to 1/2 of its
present cost, it would enhance the market for the CANDU
reactor, and the process would be very attractive, especially
to countries which had not already made a substantial com-
mitment to other methods. Here, we briefly review the recent
research whicn applies the technique of isotopically
selective multiple photon dissociation (MPD) to deuterium
separation. General discussions of the prospects for heavy
water via LIS are given in references 14 and 15 , while
results of research in techniques other than MPD can be found
in references 16-18. The basic idea in MPD is quite simple:
an infrared laser is tuned to one of the characteristic
molecular vibrational frequencies of the deuterated species
in a natural mixture, and dissociation takes place when the
number of photons absorbed from the beam is sufficient to reach
the threshold energy for dissociation via a process of "climbing
the vibrational ladder". However, the details of MPD, e.g.,
its dependence on: the energy and length of the laser pulse,
the rotational structure of the molecule, and molecular
collisions, makes it a very complicated subject. Most at-
tention has been focused on the molecule uranium hexafluOride,
UF6, and its unclassified surrogate, SF6. However, recent
work has demonstrated that MPD has promise for deuterium
separation as well. In this regard, Marling, Herman and
Thomas have summarized some of the requirements for the use
of this tecnnique in a commercially viable process as follows: 9
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(1) The single-step deuterium enrichment factor must
exceed 1000 to minimize make-up costs, i.e., the
replacement cost of optically destroyed working
molecules. In addition, a ratio of greater than
1000-to-1 and preferably 104-to-1 should exist in
the optical absorption coefficients of the mono-
deuterated and normal molecule at the laser wave-
length and energy fluence where reaction occurs.
This is essential for gas-phase medium penetration
and efficient photon utilization.20
(2) The selective absorption must be accessible by
an efficient, high-peak and high-average-power laser--
essentially restricting consideration to only the
CO2 laser.
(3) The protonated molecule must undergo rapid deuterium
exchange tied to an aqueous or natural gas feedstream
for redeuteration of the working material, if water
or methane is not used directly.
(4) Hydrolysis, solvalysis or other irreversible reactions
of the working material with the exchange medium must
3 4be at least 103-10 times slower than the rate of
redeuteration. This insures that the major loss of
the working material per cycle (amounting to 0.01-0.1%)
is dominated by the photochemical removal of deuterium
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and not losses during the redeuteration step.
(5) The deuterium-bearing photoproduct must be resistant
to D/H exchange with the working molecule.
(6) The yield of deuterium-bearing photoproduct should
approach unity (>'0.5) under MPD fluence conditions
consistent with high single-step deuterium enrichment.
(7) The spectroscopy and photochemistry of the candidate
molecule must allow high pressure operation in the
range of >/ 0.1 atm. This is essential for realistic
gas pumping costs and manageable photochemical reactor
size.
(8) The working material should be of low cost (, $2/kg),
adequately volatile and (ideally) non-flammable, non-
carcinogenic and non-toxic.
In the light of the above, it is instructive to make a "back-
of-the envelope" calculation of the laser costs for a process
based on MPD of the trifluoromethane molecule, CHF3.
The laser energy required per separated D atom, ED, for
deuterium separation by CO2 laser MPD of CHF3 is given by the
expression
E nhc r1 1 1, (5)
DE w S(D/H)J
where we use the measured values21 of optical selectivity,
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S = 1500 at a photolysis wavelength X of 10.3Pm, and dissociation
probabilty ° of one at a laser fluence of 30J/cm2 with sufficient
buffer gas, and assume: the dissociation barrier n = 25 photons,
the laser efficiency = 14%, the molecular excitation effi-
ciency = 0.5, and the deuterium abundance (D/H) = 150 ppm.
Equation (5) then gives a laser electrical energy ED = 0.25 Kev
per separated D atom, or about 0.6 Kev of equivalent thermal
energy as compared with approximately 2.7 Kev per D atom for
the GS process. Despite the fact that the former estimate
neglects non-laser related energy costs associated with pumping
the gas and redeuterating the depleted CHF3, it is still rather
encouraging. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the
laser capital costs for this process. It is straightforward
to show that this is about 75 watts of installed capacity/kg
D2O/yr. If TEA laser power is available at w0' then at a
D20/rwat heta 
capital charge rate of 0.15/yr. the laser capital cost component
for this process would be $7,500/kg D20/yr. x 0.15/yr = $1125/kg D20.
This again illustrates the fact that high quality (low entropy)
laser energy is expensive, and unless order of magnitude
reductions in capital cost can be achieved, lasers may be
uneconomic for this application.
3..,4 Transfer Processes
As noted in Chapter I, transfer processes are those which
take advantage of the high separation factors of hydrogen-based
processes without the capacity limitations inherent in parasitic
operation. The generic means to this end is to contact one of
the depleted exchange partners in a hydrogen-based process with
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a natural water feed, thereby transferring deuterium from the
latter to the former. The price one pays for this flexibility
is the capital and operating costs of the transfer unit and
the associated equipment required to make the transfer opera-
tion compatible with the flowsheet of the hydrogen-based pro-
cess. The potential for linking the amine-hydrogen process
to a water feed via either hydrogen-water or amine-water
exchange is discussed by Rae2 3 and by Sulzer24 respec-
tively. Their basic conclusion is that the need for catalysis
in hydrogen-water exchange and the fact that the exchange ten-
dency is in the "wrong" direction for this application--i.e.,
it favors transfer of deuterium from hydrogen to water, thus
necessitating operation at high temperatures--makes this route
less attractive than amine-water exchange. Since the amine-
hydrogen process itself has not been implemented commercially,
it is perhaps premature to consider a transfer process incor-
porating it in further detail; of more immediate interest is
the transfer process combining monothermal ammonia-hydrogen
exchange with redeuteration of the ammonia via a water contact.25
Since a detailed flowsheet of this process is not available at
the present time, we content ourselves here with some educated
guesses as to what it might entail.
A simplified flowsheet is shown in Figure 2 . As indicated,
liquid ammonia, depleted in deuterium, from the ammonia synthe-
sis unit of the hydrogen-ammonia process , is depressurized
and introduced as ammonia vapor at the bottom of the transfer
section of the extraction tower . Here the upflowing gas
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becomes reinriched with deuterium via countercurrent chemical
exchange with downflowing natural water introduced at the top of
this section . The distillation sections at the bottom (
and top of the extraction tower strip dissolved ammonia
from the waste water before discharge,and strip water vapor
from the redeuterated ammonia gas before it is reintroduced
into the hydrogen-ammonia process. The latter step is partic-
ularly important since, as previously noted, the potassium
amide catalyst used to promote hydrogen-ammonia exchange
forms explosive mixtures with oxygen compounds. In addition,
this anhydrous ammonia must be condensed Q and pumped Q
to the high operating pressure of the hydrogen-ammonia ex-
change tower which consists of stripping and enriching sections
. Also indicated are the ammonia cracking unit for gaseous
reflux and the final treatment step to produce reactor-grade
heavy water. Not shown is the equipment for catalyst
deuterium stripping and separation.
The operating parameters of the extraction tower; e.g.,
temperature, pressure, number of theoretical plates would,
of course, be chosen so as to minimize the incremental cost
of heavy water produced by hydrogen-ammonia exchange due to
contact with water. This implicitly assumes that the latter
would be built around a standard monothermal hydrogen-ammonia
flowsheet; e.g., as practiced at Marzingarbe. Since transfer
operation frees one from the constraint of designing for much
the same pressure and temperature range as the associated
ammonia plant, this is not necessarily the case. Thus, the
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values shown in Figure 2 may be far from optimum, and are
given for illustrative purposes only.
3
-.. ,
2., M o-ikerm -
Pro gess
( SnmmoreHsyorv~nri
ori Wa v'+r Feea
Sti-
ToCor
~-2 70C
350 An©
Ehncrin
EbtcAre
DO°C.
14 OH
M-
WO'e-t"
,PrbA "'ct
t-:1 y' Clk c4n3e
i
FILA, r f.,
-119-
3.3 Implementing the Technology on a Large Scale
The basic question we wish to consider here is the following:
to what extent can various heavy water production processes
be implemented in a particular country at a given time?
In particular, we assume that the processes have been
developed elsewhere, so that what we are considering is a
specific example of the general issue of conditions for the
successful transfer of technology from developed to developing
countries. While we do not rule out the possibility of inno-
vation in heavy water technology in a developing country, it
seems reasonable in the light of historical experience to
expect that such innovation will take the form of variations
on a technique developed elsewhere, rather than pioneering
research and development.
An additional caveat concerns how we define successful
implementation of technology. Of late, that aspect of the
problem which is conjured up by the phrase "appropriate tech-
nology" has received increasing attention.26 These dimensions
of technology transfer are certainly interesting, and in
some sense lie at the heart of the matter. Unfortunately,
an adequate discussion would carry us too far afield. Here
we adopt a narrow, operational view of success: can the plants
be built in a time, at a cost and operated at a capacity
factor characteristic of plants of the same type in developed
countries? And if not, why?
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A key factor here is the availability of and the extent of
reliance on outside assistance. At one extreme is the classic
turnkey operation wherein the basic design of a facility,
as well as the key personnel, hardware and software needed
to implement the design are all imported. At the other end
of the spectrum is the essentially indigenous undertaking.
Here, while it occasionally proves profitable to take advantage
of the availability on a timely basis of selected design
data and particular items of equipment from outside suppliers,
there is often an official policy of maximizing the indigenous
component, even at the price of a significant time/cost
penalty. In practice, the design, construction and operation
of plants utilizing what might loosely be called "high tech-
nology" in most countries, developed and developing, involves
degrees of outside assistance which fall between these ex-
tremes. In the particular case of heavy water processes,
it would seem at first glance that there are a number of
factors which would tend to enhance the prospects for the
successful implementation of this technology in those de-
veloping countries with a significant industrial sector; e.g.,
India, Argentina and Taiwan.
(1) the existence in te open literature of a wealth
of relevant information; specifically, data relating to process
fundamentals, flowsheets, materials and construction techniques,
and operating history, particularly for the GS process. In
fact, using such information, pilot GS plants have been con-
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structed in a number of countries, including India and Rmania.
(2) as compared with either nuclear reactors and spent
fuel reprocessing plants on the one hand or facilities for
uranium enrichment via gaseous diffusion or the gas centri-
fuge on the other, heavy water production involves neither
containment of intensely radioactive nuclear materials nor
sophisticated technologies which, moreover, have been closely
held on nonproliferation grounds.
(3) the existence of other industrial processes which
involve operations such as countercurrent chemical separations,
catalysis, and handling of some of the same materials used in
heavy water processes. Of particular relevance are hydrocarbon
fuel refinery operations such as fractional distillation,
catalytic cracking, and desulphurization, especially of sour
natural gas.
Despite the above, the historical record indicates that
construction and successful operation of heavy water production
plants is difficult, even in developed countries such as
Canada. The countervailing factors include the following:
(1) Although much has been published about heavy water
production processes, there are important pieces of information
which are closely held, for both nonproliferation and proprietary
reasons. For example, for large GS plants, the details of
such matters as: feedwater treatment, sieve tray design,
process control, behavior of impurities in the system, and
materials performance and corrosion are not readily available.
-122-
A similar statement could be made about the other process of
current commercial interest: hydrogen-ammonia exchange.
This is not academic, since insight in these areas can mean
the difference between a plant which works haphazardly at
best, and one that operates reliably at design capacity. In
this connection, the point is often made, especially with
regard to clandestine facilities for reprocessing irradiated
nuclear fuel, that an important difference might exist between
a commercial plant and a "quick-and-dirty", weapons-dedicated
minimal facility. The distinction might be an important one,
but should not be overemphasized. For example, production of any
significance in the GS process requires that trays be level,
foaming on trays be minimized, process temperatures and flow
ratios be carefully controlled, there be good maintenance of
piping insulation and steam tracing, power supply be reliable,
etc.
(2) Related to the above is the question of hardware
availability. That is, even with knowledge sufficient to
write detailed specifications for all required equipment,
it must still be built according to these - often stringent -
specifications, and, in many cases, this poses a severe tech-
nological challenge. For example, in the GS process, the
dilute nature of the feed, limited recovery from feed, and a
design philosophy of minimizing the number of parallel units
in a stage leads to the use of first stage high pressure
towers and sieve trays which are amongst the largest in the
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chemical industry. Moreover, high standards of quality control
in tower construction is not only a matter of economics; the
use of such large vessels containing correspondingly large
inventories of toxic hydrogen sulphide gas makes the con-
sequences of a major leak a matter of grave safety
concern. Due to transportation limitations, these towers
must be constructed on site by welding individual ring sections
together, and then stress relieving the entire completed
27
tower. Another piece of equipment whose construction is
highly non-trivial are the gas blowers which circulate the
hydrogen sulfide through the towers. These are very large
machines; egstypical specifications are: speed: 1860 rpm,
4 28
motor horsepower: 7000, and capacity: 96 x 10 SCFM. 
Moreover, they must be corrosion-resistant to wet H2S and
leakproof. In the case of both the monothermal and bithermal
realizations of the hydrogen-ammonia exchange processes,
careful attention must be paid to the integration of the
heavy water plant with the syngas feed, so that ammonia production
is not affected. As compared to the GS process, the problems
posed by the corrosion and toxicity of the process fluids are
not as great; neither are they entirely absentk however. For
example, the catalyst needed to promote the exchange reaction,
potassium amide, corrodes organic materials, and the use of
high-purity hydrogen - to prevent explosive reaction with the
amide - reduces the notch impact strength of high-grade
steels. Considerations such as these, in the context of
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the low temperature and high pressure characteristic of this
process, imply that careful attention must be paid to materials
and construction. In particular, the contacting equipment
must be of special design, and the large, heavy towers must
be constructed at the factory in one piece, and transported
29to the site.29
(3) While pilot plants are useful in gaining familiarity
with a process, there is a quantum jump involved in building
a large production facility on the basis of pilot plant ex-
perience. Basically, this gap involves the technical and
managerial expertise required to build and operate large
industrial plants. For example, while a 100 ton per year GS
plant may have three first-stage towers, each 4.4 m in diam-
eter and weighing 285 tons which must be fabricated in the field,
the first stage for a one-ton per year pilot plant could be
a single tower approximately 0.6 m in diameter and correspond-
ingly thinner-and lighter, which could easily be built in
one piece at the factory and transported to the site. The
smaller plant volume also implies a smaller holdup of hydrogen
sulfide, smaller and/or fewer trays, blowers, pumps, heat
exchangers and other equipment, no requirement for siting
near a nuclear power plant in order to utilize low-cost nuclear
steam, less need for reliable back-up power and precise
process control, easier maintenance, etc. Similar considerations
would apply in scaling up from pilot plant realizations of
other heavy water processes such as hydrogen-ammonia exchange
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to large capacity commercial facilities. The former are
certainly useful for gaining experience with the process -
particularly in the area of materials testing - and also
as a source of heavy water for: scientific research, inventory
makeup in existing power reactors, and possibly the initial
inventory of small heavy-water-moderated plutonium production
reactors (The last issue is discussed in the next section.).
However, the great difference in the number and variety of
technical and managerial skills required makes construction
and operation of large plants significantly more difficult.
The manpower estimates for a 400 ton per year GS plant
enumerated in Table 4 give an indication of the magnitude
of the latter task.30 In addition, a special initial opera-
tions group of approximately 15 professionals would be required
for plant commissioning, and a staff of approximately 400 -
including resident engineers, maintenance personnel, and
control room operators - is needed for normal operations.31
In sum, the construction and operation of a hundred ton
per year heavy water plant is a large industrial enterprise
with demanding quality control requirements. Thus, it is not
surprising that successful implementation of heavy water
technology require the resolution of similar problems as arise
in the introduction of nuclear power technology in developing
countries. The following statement from a recent
IAEA publication is particularly germane:
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Table 4
Manpower Requirements for
the Construction of a 400 ton per year
GS Heavy Water Plant
Home Office
Engineering Design Group - ' 150
including chemical, civil,
mechanical, electrical,
industrial engineers and
draftsmen
Project Management Group - . 50
including scheduling, cost
control, expediting and
procurement
Site
Management Group - "-100
including contractor
supervision and quality
assurance inspection
Labor Force -
-1500
including pipefitters,
welders, concrete pourers,
crane operators, insulators
and electricians
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Experience has shown that the most serious problem
which the developing countries have had to date
have not been of the type which require additional
manpower with advanced academic training in nuclear
science and technology, but are rather of the type
which require (a) manpower with practical experience
and training in the technical, organization, con-
tractual and administrative aspects of large pro- 32
jects and (b) technicians and skilled craft labour.
(4) Regarding technology transfer from other industrial
processes, experience in such areas as oil refining and
hydrogen production via coal gassification for synthetic
ammonia production would certainly be helpful, but there are
also significant differences. For example, in fractional
distillation of crude oil, the equipment is of much smaller
scale since basically all the feed is utilized as product.
Moreover, as compared with the GS process, tray correlations
are different, and process control is less stringent. On
the other hand, refinery desulphurization via catalytic extrac-
tion of organosulphur values from the oil as hydrogen sulphide
does provide useful experience in working with H2S. In
general, a country which can build and operate a complete
oil refinery or synthesis gas plant for ammonia production
has a solid foundation which might make the construction of
a large heavy water plant a feasible undertaking.
Of late, the realities f technology transfer are in
danger of being lost in a cloud of North-South rhetoric. In
particular, the North is being warned that it is in its best
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interests to share its technological expertise on more favor-
able terms than hitherto since, at best, it is only a matter
of time before the advanced developing countries catch up
and then forge ahead. This view is widely shared, even by
many astute "Northern" observers. For example, according
to Harvey Brooks,
The most important fact about a new technol-
ogy is the knowledge that it can work. With
that knowledge any nation with a reasonably
sophisticated technical capability of its own
can duplicate a technological development more
cheaply than its originator, even without tech-
nology transfer.33
With regard to nuclear technologies such as heavy water pro-
duction, we would reply: Yes, but. The heart of the matter
is the phrase, "reasonably sophisticated technical capabil-
ity." Does it include engineering "know-why" as well as
"know-how"?--i.e., not only how to reproduce a known design,
but also the ability to understand the rationale behind the
original designer's choices so as to be able to modify that
in the light of new operating conditions. Does it include
an appreciation of the importance of quality assurance and
quality consciousness among both craft labor and supervisory
personnel? Does it include a mangement team with the skills
needed to co-ordinate and direct the construction of a large
project? Does it include an overall esprit de corps and
dedication to getting the job done right?
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Rhetoric aside, the heart of the matter is a keen under-
standing of the technical fundamentals and the availability
of the requisite skills/attitudes, materials and facilities.
Without these elements--some of which are technology-specific
--the cost and time penalties involved in reproducing a for-
eign high technology will be prohibitive.
(continued)
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3.4 Heavy Water for Production Reactors
To meet the moderator requirements of a production reactor
which produces roughly 10 kg. of plutonium per year requires
on the order of 15-20 tons of heavy water. This amount could
be supplied by several years of operation of a small plant,
or much more quickly via diversion from a large facility.
3.4.1 Small plants
As with the initial choice between graphite or heavy water
moderation for the production reactor, the decision as to which
process to use in a small plant would depend on the proliferation
scenario. That is, for a country which has chosen natural
uranium, heavy water reactors for power generation, construction
of a pilot plant utilizing the GS process for primary extraction
- and water distillation for finishing to reactor grade con-
centration - would be a logical way to gain familiarity with
the GS process. As we have seen, working with the H2S/H20
system requires that careful attention be paid to toxicity and
corrosion, but at this date, 27 years after the initial operation
of the first GS plants in the U.S. and with GS pilot plants
having been built in France, Sweden, Romania, India, the
Soviet Union, and probably the People's Republic of China,
this task is probably.within the capability of those developing
countries with a moderate industrial base and some expertise
in chemical processing. On the other hand, if indigenous
skills are modest, and there is no desire to pursue heavy
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water production commercially on a large scale, it would be
logical to use water distillation for both extraction and
finishing. As compared with the Manhattan District water
distillation plants, plants built today would use tower
internals with greater capacity per unit volume to minimize
total tower volume, and more efficient means of providing the
required low temperature process heat. While the tower
volume would still be large in comparison with that required for
primary extraction via the GS process, this factor alone need
not be decisive in ruling it out even if a desire for minimal
"visibility" is an important criterion in the choice of a
process. A recent publication devoted to the subject of
clandestine production of small amounts of heavy water con-
cluded that the likely combination to be used would be primary
enrichment by electrolysis followed by ammonia distillation.34
While it is true that modification of an existing electrolytic
hydrogen plant can provide primary enrichment of heavy water
at practically zero cost, the obvious caveat is that electrolytic
nydrogen plants are rare, essentially restricted to those
sites where cheap hydropower is available. Hydrogen is more
commonly available as ammonia synthesis gas; unfortunately,
this does not provide a similar opportunity for preinrichment;
in fact - due to the water-gas reaction used to make hydrogen -
the deuterium concentration is lower than normal, typically
about 100 ppm. Also, if electrolytic hydrogen is available,
it would be much more straightforward to bring the preenriched
product up to reactor grade by water distillation than the
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recommended technique of first converting it to ammonia,
distilling the ammonia, cracking the product to obtain en-
riched deuterium, and finally burning this in pure oxygen
to produce heavy water product. 35It is interesting to note
that the idea of using ammonia distillation with enriched
feed from an electrolytic cascade was considered by India for
its first heavy water plant at Nangal. 6 However, this scheme
was rejected in favor of hydrogen distillation, and the only
commercial application of the ammonia distillation process
was at Marzingarbe where it was used from-1968-1972 to bring
ammonia enriched to 2% deuterium via monothermal hydrogen -
ammonia exchange to reactor grade product. However, in
the two hydrogen-ammonia plants presently nearing completion
in India which are technically derived from Marzingarbe,
final enrichment is made in a second monothermal stage
rather than by ammonia distillation. In the Indian plant
utilizing bithermal hydrogen-ammonia exchange for primary
extraction, the product is brought to reactor grade by first
transferring the deuterium to water and then distilling it.
In practice, of course, the process actually used in a clan-
destine facility would depend strongly on the "targets of
opportunity". That is, the opportunity to secretly acquire
key hardware and/or technical data might make attractive
a process which would not be feasible in terms of indigenous
capabilities alone. In this sense, the attitude towards export
controls of the advanced industrialized countries will obviously
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be a key factor in the spread of this technology. Of particular
importance are the interpretations given the phrase "or major
critical components thereof" in the definition of exported
technology which triggers safeguards according to the London
Suppliers Guidelines.
'Technology' means technical data in physical form
designated by the supplying country as important to
the design, construction, operation, or maintenance
of enrichment, reprocessing, or eavy water production
facilities or major critical components thereof, but
excluding data available to the public, for example,
in published books and periodicals, or that which
has been made available internationally without
restrictions upon its further dissemination.37
3.4.2 Diversion from a large plant
Here the key concern is the presence and efficacy of
safeguards. Although the London Club Guidelines include
heavy water technology on the trigger list, heavy water plants
have heretofore not been safeguarded by the IAEA. An obvious
starting point would be to define the safeguards goal as that
amount of heavy water which could moderate a reactor whose
yearly plutonium production is on the order of 10 kg. This
would be on the order of 15-20 tons of reactor-grade product;
or correspondingly larger amounts of material of lower con-
centration. Safeguards for a heavy water plant would, of
course, have to be tailored to the particular process involved.
However, all would involve the safeguards triad: containment,
surveillance, and materials accounting. In lieu of detailed
analyses of particular processes,38 we make the following
general observations:
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(1) Heavy water is a valuable material, process materials
are often toxic, and plant shutdowns are costly in terms of
lost production. (For example, even a short interruption of
power, lasting minutes for the steam and only milliseconds
for the electricity in a large GS plant, will result in
complete shutdown and five days are required to regain equi-
librium: equivalent to two to three days lost production.) This
indicates that standard industrial practice would mandate
stringent containment, surveillance and product accounting
procedures, as well as periodic testing of equipment integrity,
and sampling of process fluids as part of the normal operating
procedure. Safeguard procedures could naturally build on
this base.
(2) Virgin heavy water product contains only minute
activity due to natural tritium, 5 x 10 7 Ci/Kg,39 and in
any case, the beta emission from this isotope would not pene-
trate the steel drums in which the product is stored. Thus,
surveillance and containment of product could not take advan-
tage of an inherent radiation signature. However, determina-
tion of deuterium abundance by active means; e.g., neutron
interrogation, would seem feasible.
(3) A logical sub-block of the entire plant for materials
accountancy would be the finishing unit, which as noted, is
usually accomplished by water distillation. It is at this
point; i.e., when the deuterium content is on the order of
1% or higher, that the heavy water becomes valuable since
only a small amount of additional separative work (1%) is
required to bring it up to reactor grade. Fortunately, it is
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also at this point that the concentrations are high enough
and the flows low enough so that it should be feasible to
take measurements accurate enough to insure that the limit
of error in the materials unaccounted for (LEMUF) is within
the safeguards goal.
(4) All safeguard schemes will have to take into account,
to a varying degree, the proprietary nature of all of the
production processes of commercial interest. As previously
noted, basic information on all of these is available in the
open literature, but detailed know-how is protected by patents
and otherwise restricted. This problem, of course, is not
unique to heavy water plants, but exists with other "sensitive
technologies;" e.g., uranium enrichment.
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3.5 Proprietary and Nonproliferation Constraints
There are two types of constraints on the transfer of
heavy water production technology: proprietary and nonpro-
liferation; we discuss each briefly in turn.
3.5.1 Proprietary
The situation with regard to patents on heavy water pro-
duction processes has been aptly summarized by Silberring:
Most early patents for different processes
or process steps are expired. A number of
later patent applications are weak, since
what is claimed has already been published
earlier. Consequently, no serious legal ob-
stacles exist to prevent the use of a number
of processes and/or equipment by anybody.40
Indeed, one comes away from even a short exposure to the
relevant technical literature with the strong impression that
the control of such companies as Lummus, Sulzer and Uhde over
their heavy water technologies is much less a matter of pat-
ent protection than a mastery of the details of the particu-
lar processes. Moreover, because of the strong temptation
for the competition to utilize an invention without paying
the price--by grasping its essence and then modifying and
improving or designing around it--high technology companies
today tend to omit important details from their patent appli-
cations or take the risk of not filing at all. In the heavy
water field, the "modifying and improving" method has been
the basis for the (thus far) successful effort of AECL to
establish a heavy water industry in Canada utilizing the GS
process without further compensation to Jerome Spevack and
the Deuterium Corporation beyond the $3 million payment made
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by the Province of Nova Scotia in 1966 for Spevack's interest
in his Canadian subsidiary, Deuterium of Canada, Ltd., togeth-
er with an exclusive license for use in the Province of Nova
Scotia of Deuterium Corporation's Canadian patents and propri-
etary information relevant to the GS process. This agreement
thus covers the Glace Bay and Port Hawkesbury GS plants in
Nova Scotia, but not the Bruce heavy water plants in Ontario.
The position of AECL with regard to the latter is that
Canadian modifications and improvements to Spevack's orig-
inal wartime patent, which was transferred from the U.S. AEC
to AECL in 1959 pursuant to the patent exchange provisions
(Article IX) of the 1955 U.S.-Canadian agreement for co-op-
41
eration in the civil uses in atomic energyestablishes its
own patent position on GS technology, in particular in Can-
ada, but also in the U.S. and other countries. Spevack's
control of GS technology in the U.S. is based on his numerous
U.S. patents and a license agreement between Deuterium Cor-
poration and the U.S. AEC which was part of a settlement
reached in 1974 between the two parties of litigation ini-
tiated by Spevack for compensation for the use of his GS
inventions by the AEC at its Savannah River and Dana plants42.
The agreement allows the U.S. Government to continue to use
Spevack's inventions for production of up to 250 tons of
heavy water per year at the Savannah River plant.
In addition, the Government has the option to convert its
license to one for use of the invention in new government-
owned plants, but limited
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to the production of heavy water solely for use by the Gov-
ernment itself. Deuterium Corp. and Spevack receive the
irrevocable royalty-free right to unlimited use of the in-
ventions of all patents and patent applications owned or
controlled by AEC for concentration of any isotopes by the
dual-temperature method and/or for the production of heavy
water. Although the battle between Spevack and AECL over
43heavy water patent rights in the U.S. and Canada continues43,
one has the impression that it is largely academic both for
the reasons cited by Silberring and because the prospects
for additional GS plants in these countries, particularly
the U.S., are remote. The situation in other countries is
more interesting. Spevack has taken out patents on his in-
ventions in numerous foreign countries44; many of these have
now expired. Unfortunately (for him), India, the only other
country besides Canada which has attempted to implement the
GS process commercially, adopted quite early in the develop-
ment of its nuclear program a highly protectionist policy
towards the import of foreign nuclear technology which, in
particular, precludes the issuance of patents for heavy water
production processes. To the extent that other advanced
developing countries become interested in heavy water pro-
duction, it is quite probable that they would follow the
Indian example. In this situation, the existence of patents
on GS and other processes4 5 will not be the limiting factor
in their ability to implement them.
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3.5.2 Nonproliferation
3.5.2.1 U.S. Controls
There are three types of controls on heavy water technology
mandated by U.S. legislation. These are administered by the
Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC), and the Commerce Department, and are described briefly
below. Statuary authority for these controls derives from
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (most recently by
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA)), and the
Export Administration Act.
3.5.2.1.1 Department of Energy
The authority for DOE controls stems from Section 57b of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which prohibits
"persons" (i.e., individuals, corporations or other organiza-
tions) under U.S. jurisdiction from directly or indirectly
engaging in the production of any special nuclear material
outside the U.S. except pursuant to an intergovernmental
agreement for cooperation or by a determination of the
Secretary of Energy, with the concurrence of the Secretary of
State, that such activity will not be inimical to the interests
of the U.S. (The heavy water connection obviously stems from
the indirect production of special nuclear materials; e.g.,
via heavy water-moderated production reactors.)
The implementing regulation for Section 57b is 10 CFR 810,
Unclassified Activities in Foreign ATomic Energy Programs.
Specifically, pursuant to para. 810.7(2) and para. 810.8,
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specific authorization from the Department of Energy is
required before engaging in any of the following activities
outside of the United States:
(i) Designing or assisting in the design of facilities
for . the production of heavy water ... or especially
designed equipment or components ...; or
(ii) Constructing, fabricating, or operating such
facilities; or
(iii) Constructing, fabricating, or furnishing
equipment or components especially designed for
use in such facilities; or
(iv) Training foreign personnel in the design,
construction, fabrication, or operation of such
facilities or equipment or components espeically
designed therefore [sic]; or
(v) Furnishing information not available to the
public in published form for use in the design,
construction, fabrication or operation of such
facilities or equipment or components especially
designed therefore; ...
Indeed, according to paras. 810.7(b)(3) and (4), the only
activities involving heavy water production technology
transfer which do not require prior authorization by the
Department of Energy are limited to: participation in
- meetings or conferences sponsored by educational institutions,
laboratories, scientific or technical organizations; inter-
national conferences held under the auspices of a nation or a
group of nations; or exchange programs approved by the
Secretary of State; or the furnishing of information which
_- is available to the public in published form.
In the NNPA, a new category of information is defined:
"sensitive nuclear technology." According to Sec. 4(a)(6) of
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the Act, this means
any information (including infomration incor-
porated in a production or utilization facility
or important component part thereof) which is
not available to the public and which is important
to the design, construction, fabrication, operation
or maintenance of a uranium enrichment or nuclear
fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the
production of heavy water, but shall not include
Restricted Data constrolled pursuant to chapter 12
of the 1954 Act; ...
According to the legislative history of the Act, the task
of deciding what information falls under this definition
was viewed by the drafters of this legislation as a natural
extension of the duties of the DOE Office of Classification;
i.e.: "The normal processes of classification and declassi-
- fication by the Department of Energy [DOE] will determine
what information will be controlled by this definition."
Although this does not constitute a statutory requirement,
the task of explicitly defining "sensitive nuclear technology"
has been undertaken by the DOE Division of International
Security Affairs (ISA), and will be published as amendments
to the relevant portions of paragraph 810.7(2).
3.5.2.1.2 Nuclear Regulatory Commission
The NRC is responsible for licensing the export of nuclear
facilities and materials, and specially designed parts and
components therefor. The implementing regulation for this
requirement is 10 CFR 110, Export and Import of Nuclear
Equipment and Materials. In particular, paragraph (3) of
appendix A of this regulation lists as items subject to NRC
licensing authority:
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Plants for the production of heavy water,
deuterium and deuterium compounds, and specially
designed or prepared parts and components therefor
~- ~(export only).
With regard to the above, it is important to note that
the scope of export control under NRC's export licensing
jurisdiction which is mandated by the NNPA goes beyond
"specially designed or prepared parts and components there-
_- for." According to Sec. 402(b):
In addition to other requirements of law, no major
critical components of any uranium enrichment,
nuclear fuel reprocessing, or heavy water
production facility shall be exported under any
agreement for cooperation ... unless such
agreement for cooperation specifically designates
such components as items to be exported pursuant
to the agreement for cooperation. For purposes
of this subsection, the term "major critical
component" means any component part or group of
component parts which the President determines
to be essential to the operation of a complete
uranium enrichment, nuclear fuel reprocessing, or
heavy water production facility.
3.5.2.1.3 Department of Commerce
According to Department of Commerce Regulation para.
378.4(b), a validated license is required for export to all
destinations, including Canada, of any commodity where the
exporter knows, or has reason to know that the export will be
used in heavy water production. This regulation reinforces the
NRC and DOE regulations outlined above, which are the primary
U.S. mechanisms for control of heavy water production technology
and equipment.
The sum and substance of the above is that the U.S. Gov-
ernment is now authorized by domestic law to take into account
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what might be called "the big picture" when considering the
export of heavy water production equipment and technology.
That is, not only are complete plants covered, but also, in
decreasing order of specificity, specially designed or
prepared parts and components therefor, major critical compo-
nents, or indeed any commodity. However, the latter two
categories are abviously grey areas, and a strong commitment
to the importance of export controls in U.S. government
agencies and among U.S. "persons" will be needed to attain
compliance with both the spirit and the letter of the law.
3.5.2.1.4 Criteria and Administration
According to the NNPA, heavy water production equipment
and technology cannot be exported unless certain criteria are
satisfied. In particular, Sec. 306 of the NNPA mandates
that no export of sensitive nuclear technology to non-nuclear
weapons states shall be made "unless IAEA safeguards are
maintained with respect to all peaceful nuclear activities in,
under the jurisdiction of, or carried out under the control
of such state at the time of the export."
Export license requests relevant to heavy water produc-
tion are reviewed by the administrating agencies, in consul-
tation with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and
the Departments of State and Defense. To facilitate this review
and to comply with Sec. 304 of the NNPA, a formal interagency
Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination has been established.
The Subgroup reviews any license application for the export or
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transfer of nuclear materials, equipment or technology which
any of its member agencies consider to be sensitive or to
raise significant nonproliferation policy questions. The
Subgroup consists of representatives from the Departments
of State, Energy, Defense, Commerce, the NRC and ACDA.
The procedure for the disposition of the export license
applications depends on the agency with which they originate.
Both NRC and DOE applications are reviewed by the other
agencies of the Subgroup who forward their recommendations
to the originating agency. In the former case the Commis-
sioners of the NRC, and in the latter the Secretary of Energy,
then makes an independent determination in approving or
denying the license. If either the NRC or the DOE fail to
issue a license because of their determination that the export
criteria set forth in the NNPA have not been met, the President
is empowered under Sec. 306 of this law to authorize the
proposed export if he determines that failure to approve it
"would be seriously prejudiced to the achievement of U.S.
nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common
defense and security."
The Department of Commerce refers to the DOE, for techni-
cal and policy review, proposed exports where the exporter
knows or has reason to know that the commodities or technology
to be exported are for use in heavy water production. The
vast majority of these cases are cleared by the DOE and a
license issued by Commerce without further interagency con-
sideration. A small minority of cases are referred to the
-145-
Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination where they are
analyzed and a decision is made either to approve, disapprove,
return without action, seek additional information or obtain
governmental assurances.
From a historical perspective, the lumping of heavy water
production with uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing as
sensitive technologies in the NNPA represents a swing in the
pendulum of concern towards a less benign view of this tech-
nology in U.S. government bureaucracies and the Congress.
However, it would be misleading to characterize the preceding
Atoms for Peace era, from roughly 1955 to the explosion of
the Indian PNE in May 1974, as one of complete naivete in the
U.S. concerning the proliferation implications of heavy water
and heavy water production technology. The U.S. reacted with
growing concern in the 1960s to evidence of Indian ambitions
to obtain anindependent natural uranium fuel cycle capability
without safeguards. For example, while heavy water was
supplied for the CIRUS research reactor, and via Canada, for
the RAPP I power reactor, the attempt by India in 1967 to
obtain GS production technology from a U.S. company without
safeguards was refused.46 In a similar vein, Indian oppor-
tunities to gain "hands-on" experience with this technology
by sending technical personnel to the Savannah River plant
47were increasingly curtailed.47 We do not argue that more
could not have been done in this regard; only that nonpro-
liferation was not completely ignored in policy decisions.
Thus, the decision in 1972 to allow a U.S. company to negotiate
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with Romania for the construction of a GS plant in that
country46 had obvious geopolitical overtones. However, the
fact that Romania is a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and evidenced no weapons ambitions was also an important
consideration.
According to the NNPA, adherence to the NPT or acceptance
of the principle of full-scope safeguards is a necessary
condition for nuclear commerce with the U.S. Regarding the
specific question of the transfer of heavy water technology,
the current policy of the Carter Administration is to regard
these conditions as necessary but not sufficient. This pol-
icy is viewed with misgivings in Canada because it lumps a
technology which does not supply a direct route to weapons
with uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing which do,4 ~
hence it will be much more difficult to obtain a consensus
among other suppliers of this technology on any transfer re-
quirements which go beyond full-scope safeguards. Indeed,
as recent events in Argentina bear witness25, even this may
prove elusive. This brings us to the subject of
(2) International Controls.
In contrast to the situation with other energy sources
such as coal, the U.S. government has always played an inte-
gral role in the development and control of atomic energy.
Not surprisingly, the same is true in all other countries
where civilian and/or military applications of atomic energy
have been developed. However, the domestic statutory require-
ments and implementing regulations regarding criteria and prd-
cedures for nuclear transfers in many countries have until
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recently been rather vague, and past policy--not necessarily
practice--is in most cases better gleaned from a scrutiny of
published bilateral agreements for co-operation in the peace-
49ful uses of atomic energy.49
The first public attempt to introduce a degree of inter-
national uniformity in the safeguard requirements for nuclear
transfers was the guidelines published under the auspices of
the IAEA as INFCIRC/209 in September 1974. This document was
the work of a group of nuclear exporting countries, the 20-mem-
ber Zangger Committee, which was set up to interpret Section III
of the NPT. In particular, Memorandum B of INFCIRC/209 con-
tains a list of materials and equipment which should trigger
the application of IAEA safeguards to the nuclear material
produced, processed, or used in the facility for which the
items are supplied. From a nonproliferation perspective, the
most significant deficiencies of this "trigger" list with
regard to heavy water were the failure to:
(1) require that the transfer of sensitive technology,
as well as materials and equipment, trigger safe-
guards, including safeguards on replications and
retransfers of the technology;
(2) require safeguards not only on heavy water itself,
but also on heavy water production plants and
equipment.
Moreover, France, not being a member of the NPT, was not
a party to INFCIRC/209. Following the Indian PNE in May 1974,
-
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and subsequent disclosures that France and West Germany
planned to sell sensitive facilities to Pakistan and Brazil,
respectively, the U.S., prodded by Canada, initiated a
diplomatic campaign to raise the world's proliferation
consciousness, and in particular to repair the deficiencies
of INFCIRC/209. (India, for example, had used the omission
of heavy water plant equipment from the trigger list to obtain,
in Western Europe, items for their GS heavy water plant at
Kota which were embargoed by Car.nada fter the Indian test.)
To this end, the "London Club" of nuclear exporters was
convened in April 1975 amid great secrecy. Their delibera-
tions have been much commented on;50 hwere we only note that
their final document, published by the IAEA as INFCIRC/254 in
February 1978, only only corrects the above-noted deficiencies
in the Zanger trigger list, but also calls on the suppliers to
"exercise restraint" on the transfer of sensitive facilities
and technology (including heavy water production equipment and
technology (including heavy water production equipment and
technology) and, with regard to the latter, specifically
lists three generic technologies--exchange, electrolysis,
and hydrogen distillation--transfer of which would trigger
safeguards. Although the London Club guidelines are a sig-
51
nificant improvement on INFCIRC/209, they are the fruit of
a fragile consensus among states with varying political and
commercial perspectives, and leave open various loose ends.
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In particular,
(1) The suppliers have agreed only to exercise restraint
on the transfer of sensitive technology and facilities rather
than to prohibit them completely. Especially with regard to
heavy water production, recent events indicate that Switzerland,
and perhaps other countries, are not prepared to go beyond the
guideline provisions for facility rather than full-scope
safeguards as a condition for transfer, much less embargo these
facilities entirely.
(2) The membership of the Club does not extend to coun-
tries which may in the future be in a position to engage in
significant transfer of nuclear technology and equipment.
In the heavy water field, India in particular may attain such
a capability within the coming decade. We also note that
Argentina is going ahead with construction of an indigenous
GS pilot plant in spite of its recent agreement with the
Swiss firm Sulzer for the construction of a 250 ton per year
hydrogen-ammonia exchange transfer process plant in Argenti-
51
na. Apparently, the Argentine strategy, like that of India,
is "not to put all its heavy water eggs in one basket."
(3) Part B, para. (2) of the guidelines seems to close
the "specially designed and prepared" equipment loophole.
That is, it states that
if a supplier nation should transfer in the
aggregate a significant fraction of the items
essential to the operation of such a facility,
together with the knowhow for construction and
operation of that facility, that transfer should
be deemed to be a transfer of "facilities of
major critical components thereof."
-
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However, like the similar provisions in the U.S. NNPA, the
word "essential" is obviously open to varying interpretations
which may be tailored to accommodate different perceptions
of the importance of adherence to nonproliferation norms.
In sum, INFCIRC/254 may well represent the high-water
mark in international attempts to control the spread of sen-
sitive technologies. Specifically, with regard to heavy
water production, it is problematic whether a consensus can
be reached on a requirement of full-scope safeguards as a
condition for transfer. Given the problems involved in
implementing this technology, for the foreseeable future
this represents the major cause for concern, rather than
the prospect of spread via the efforts of countries outside
the London Club.
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